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Abstract 
 
BASTIONS OR BURDENS? ASSESSING THE ROLE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN 
HOSPITAL SHIPS DURING THE WORLD WARS  
 
Andrew J. Franklin 
B.A., Campbell University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Dr. Judkin Browning  
 
For the past several millennia, historians have dedicated great amounts of their time 
and energy to studying the history of military action and engagements. Often directing their 
attention towards the battles themselves, few scholars examine what happens to those 
soldiers who became sick or wounded on the front lines of battle. This project seeks to help 
remedy this deficiency by assessing the role of Anglo-American hospital ships during the 
First and Second World War. As far back as the eighteenth-century, military forces on both 
sides of the Atlantic have relied on hospital ships to provide a quick, efficient, safe, and 
comfortable means of evacuation for battlefield casualties. By observing their long-term 
development, and considering their performance in a number of battles around the world, this 
work argues that British and American hospital ships were a critically important presence in 
combat operations during the global conflicts of the early twentieth-century.  
At the same time, it also demonstrates that the era of the First and Second World 
represent the “golden age” of hospital ships. Following the Second World War, the ever-
changing face of modern warfare led to a decline in both countries’ use of hospital ships. 
These ships, which had at one time represented bastions of safety and healing, ultimately 
v 
 
became burdens to military powers who began to rely on other means of evacuating their 
casualties.  Finally, in an effort to learn more about the impact of war on those who waged it,  
this work will shed light on the experiences of a number of Allied nurses and soldiers who 
worked or recovered aboard one of the many hospital ships during the wars.  
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Introduction 
 
 On June 27, 1918, His Majesty’s Hospital Ship (HMHS) Llandovery Castle sank off 
the southern coast of Ireland. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Howard 
MacDonald, Llandovery Castle was making the return trip to England, after depositing 
hundreds of wounded Canadian soldiers in Nova Scotia. Around 9:30 that evening, U-86 of 
the German Imperial Navy, under the command of Helmut-Brümmer Patzig, spotted her in 
the waters of the North Atlantic and began its pursuit. According to testimonies given during 
the 1921 Leipzig War Crimes Trials, “Patzig recognized the character of the ship, which he 
had been pursuing for a long time, at the latest when she exhibited at dusk the lights 
prescribed for hospital ships by the Tenth Hague Convention. In accordance with 
international law, the German U-boats were forbidden to torpedo hospital ships.” While 
Patzig’s pursuit certainly violated international law, it also transgressed orders put forth by 
the German Naval Command, who had issued orders that hospital ships were only to be sunk 
within the limits of a specific barred area. This area did not include the southern coast of 
Ireland. 
 Nonetheless, Patzig decided to torpedo the vessel, operating under the suspicion that 
she was clandestinely transporting American airmen to the European theater. Had this been 
the case, Llandovery Castle would have forfeited the protections afforded to hospital ships 
under the Hague Conventions X and become a fair target for the German submarine. The first 
torpedo struck the port side of the vessel and caused her to begin sinking. According to 
witness testimony, Llandovery Castle had 19 lifeboats on board when she was torpedoed, and 
each boat could hold 52 men. However, the impact of the torpedo damaged a number of 
portside lifeboats. "The favorable weather assisted life-saving operations," and five lifeboats 
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in all were successfully lowered from the sinking vessel. Once in the water, the U-boat 
approached the captain’s lifeboat to determine whether or not the ship had been carrying 
Allied airmen, or munitions (another factor which would have made Llandovery Castle a fair 
target). After determining that his suspicions were indeed false, Patzig ordered the submarine 
to submerge and began circling the lifeboats. After a short time, the submarine surfaced and 
began to ram the lifeboats. 
 Moreover, in an episode that would 
become one of the greatest atrocities of the 
entire war, U-86 attempted to further cover up 
her crimes by opening fire on the lifeboats 
with machine guns as well as with the 
submarine’s 10.5cm deck gun. In all, one 
lifeboat with 24 passengers survived the 
massacre that claimed the lives of 258 
wounded soldiers, nurses, and crew members 
(see Figure 1.1).1 In a particularly grisly 
account, given after the war by Captain 
Kenneth Cummins of HMS Morea, he recalled 
the experience of sailing through the remains, 
both human and otherwise, of Llandovery 
Castle. “We were in the Bristol Channel, quite well out to sea, and suddenly we began going 
through corpses. The Germans had sunk a British hospital ship, the Llandovery Castle, and 
                                                        
1 "German War Trials: Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt," The American Journal of 
International Law 16, no. 4 (1922): 708-24. doi:10.2307/2187594.  
Figure 1.1 Propaganda poster depicting German atrocities against 
HMS Llandovery Castle. Source: Imperial War Museum, PST 
12375, https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/30965.  
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we were sailing through floating bodies. We were not allowed to stop– we just had to go 
straight through. It was quite horrific, and my reaction was to vomit over the edge.” Going 
on, Cummins remembered “seeing these bodies of women and nurses, floating in the ocean, 
having been there for some time. Huge aprons and skirts in billows, which looked almost like 
sails because they dried in the hot sun.”2  
 As the sinking of the Llandovery Castle shows, the history of military hospital ships 
is fraught with episodes of violence and courage. These stories, however, are not often 
enough told in the writing of the past. In December of 1944, Harold Larson of the Office of 
the Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces, published a monograph titled “Army 
Hospital Ships in World War II.” Before discussing more technical aspects, such as the 
evacuation procedures of 1942 and the scope of the Army hospital ship program, Larson 
provides a brief historical background of hospital ships. In the opening sentence, he writes 
that “The evacuation of the sick and wounded is a perennial problem in the history of 
warfare.” It is likely that Larson uses this sentence just as a reference to the often tricky task 
that military forces face while trying to transport casualties from the field of battle to the bed 
of convalescence. However, when one approaches this sentence from a slightly different 
angle, it also raises a much bigger issue. While the evacuation of the sick and wounded have 
certainly been a perennial problem in the history of warfare, a larger problem in the histories 
of warfare has been a lack of discussion around how militaries have gone about evacuating 
their sick and wounded. 
 This work will take the first step towards providing a remedy to this problem. To do 
this, it will examine the development and use of Anglo-American military hospital ships, 
                                                        
2 Max Arthur, “Captain Keith Cummins: Veteran of both World Wars,” The Independent, December 18, 2006. 
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focusing primarily on their roles in the First and Second World Wars. Hospital ships have 
played an integral part in many combat operations, and especially in the global wars that 
occurred in the opening half of the twentieth century. Across the long and storied past of 
crafting military histories, scholars have devoted their efforts to analyzing the tactics, 
strategies, and execution of hundreds of combat operations. However, they have said 
comparatively little about the casualties of war and their experiences after the battle ended. 
At the same time, little has been written regarding those medical staff members who were 
charged with making sure that battlefield casualties received proper medical attention. First 
person accounts of military leaders, medical thinkers, nurses, and those wounded in combat 
reveal valuable historical information about military hospital ships and their role in 
twentieth-century combat.  
 Chapter one will assess the conception and early growth of Anglo-American hospital 
ships from the end of the 18th century through the turn of the twentieth century. While vessels 
which one might unmistakably identify as hospital ships did not enter the fold until the 
1860s, there were some deliberate efforts to implement “floating hospitals” during the Age of 
Sail which proved to be influential upon later developments. For the British, the Crimean 
War and Second Opium War represented watershed moments in their approach to hospital 
ships and military medicine as a whole. It was not until the Civil War, however, that the U.S. 
government first introduced vessels to act as hospital transports for American battlefield 
casualties. These ships played a vital part in the evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers 
from the Peninsula Campaign in the summer of 1862 as well as other engagements in both 
the eastern and western theaters. Chapter one also includes a brief discussion on international 
laws, like The Hague and Geneva Conventions and the protections that they afforded to 
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military hospital ships. These are particularly important to understand when looking at the 
applications of these vessels during the world wars. Finally, we will look at the 
advancements in and use of hospital ships during The Spanish American War. Maintaining a 
complete understanding of all of these points is an essential first step in surveying the use of 
hospital ships in early twentieth-century warfare. 
 The second chapter will focus on British hospital ships from 1896-1918, using the 
First World War as a framework for assessing their efficacy in combat operations. In Great 
Britain, new theories involving the application of hospital ships developed across the decade 
and half prior to World War I. During this period, Britain’s military and medical minds 
addressed the need for purpose-built hospital ships, arguing that these vessels should be 
specifically designed to treat battlefield casualties, to supplement their fleets, and ultimately 
provide a solution to Larson’s “perennial problem.” While purpose-built vessels were the 
goal, for some, the constraints of time and war meant that Britain, as well as her Dominions 
of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, had to rely on a conversion system. In this system, 
the Admiralty of the Royal Navy could acquire old passenger liners, make alterations to the 
ships’ interior, which would allow for the housing and treatment of casualties, and introduce 
the converted ship into combat operations. Possessing a clear understanding of the initial 
goals that Great Britain hoped to achieve with their hospital ships will be extremely valuable 
for determining whether or not they had met those goals by 1918. Since Americans arrived 
late to front lines of the Great War and, therefore, were unable to field any hospital ships of 
their own, the discussion of hospital ships in World War I will be limited to the vessels of 
Great Britain and her Dominions.  
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 An analysis of the usefulness of British hospital ships during the First World War 
must consider a number of factors. First, one must assess the impacts that pre-war 
international treaties, like The Hague and Geneva Conventions, had on the effective use of 
hospital ships in combat. Namely, were international laws sufficient to prevent enemy 
combatants from preying on unarmed hospital ships? From this, one can determine whether 
or not those treaties precipitated environments wherein hospital ships proved to become more 
of a burden and less of a bastion for battlefield casualties. Second, one must assess the 
performance of hospital ships in a combat setting. One of the most notable uses of Brit ish 
medical vessels took place in the eastern Mediterranean during the Gallipoli Campaign of 
1915. As the harsh environmental features of Gallipoli’s beaches hampered the establishment 
of land-based field hospitals, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), formed from 
British, Australian, and New Zealand troops, under the command of General Sir Ian 
Hamilton, relied on the presence of hospital ships to supplement their pressing needs for 
medical care. Looking at the performance of hospital ships in battle, or their ability to 
effectively treat wounded soldiers or transport them to safety is a crucial step in determining 
whether or not they were a useful part of military operations. Finally, this section will briefly 
address the targeting of medical ships as part of Germany’s policy of unrestricted submarine 
warfare to demonstrate the potential weakness of international laws protecting hospital ships. 
 Following the assessment of British hospital ships during the Great War, chapter 
three will survey the role of American hospital ships during World War II. Opening with an 
examination of America’s hospital ship program on the heels of World War I, it will explain 
how and why the United States transitioned from the first nation to develop a hospital ship 
from the keel-up, in 1917, to scrambling to convert hospital ships in the opening years of 
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World War II. Indeed, the US military was unable to field a specially designated hospital 
ship until June 1943–a year and a half after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Furthermore, this chapter will explore how, by 1945, the United States had managed to outfit 
39 Army and Navy vessels for hospital service in all of the combat theaters around the world. 
In addition, it will seek to understand the lack of inter-branch cooperation between the Army 
and Navy that led to the initial delay in the opening stages of the conflict. 
 With regard to the performance of American hospital ships in combat, chapter three 
will focus on their presence in the Pacific Theater and their importance in the Battle of Iwo 
Jima. By 1945, clearly marked hospital ships were no longer as prominent as they had been 
during the First World War. In some cases, the distinguishing white paint and Red Cross 
markings on hospital ships made them enticing targets for Japanese bombs and kamikaze 
pilots. Therefore, some hospital ships preferred to blend in and operate without their 
prominent markings and without the protections of international law. More often, though, the 
shortage of hospital ships caused by inefficient growth during the interwar period 
necessitated higher levels of improvisation. As a result, by the closing years of World War II, 
casualties were often evacuated and provided treatment aboard modified vessels that were 
not afforded the protections of international law. It was during this period, after World War 
II, that the use of hospital ships began its decline. 
Finally, this work’s epilogue will briefly consider the state of military hospital ships 
in the post-1945 era. Across the nearly eight decades since end of World War II, military 
technology has rapidly advanced to the point where hospital ships on the front lines are no 
longer necessary as the primary method of casualty evacuation. Helicopters and airplanes 
ultimately made aerial evacuations a safer and quicker alternative to seaborne evacuations. 
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Down from its fleet of 39 medically equipped vessels in 1945, today the United States 
military operates only two hospital ships–United States Naval Ship (USNS) Mercy (T-AH-
19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH-20). Both ships are converted tankers, built in the years after 
the Vietnam War. In 2004, Vice Admiral Michael Cowan, the Navy Surgeon General and 
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, remarked that Mercy and Comfort were 
“wonderful ships, but they’re dinosaurs. They were designed in the '70s, built in the '80s, and 
frankly, they're obsolete.”3 As the future of military hospital ships remains in the balance, an 
assessment of their use in twentieth-century combat will be an essential first step in 
determining how they might be used in battles yet to come.   
*** 
 Historiography focused on combat medicine, and the use of hospital ships during 
early twentieth-century warfare is scant. Therefore, this work hopes to be a valuable 
contribution to that scholarship, opening the floor for scholarly conversation and debate, 
while providing new avenues of exploration which will prove useful for future historians 
interested in military, medical, or maritime history. The stories of hospital ships, those who 
worked on them, as well as those whose lives they saved are essential pieces of history that 
deserve to be brought to light.  
 One of the most well-known and often cited works of military history is John 
Keegan’s The Face of Battle (1976). In a section titled “The Deficiencies of Military 
History” Keegan outlines the basic tenants of “the old” military history. Among these are a 
focus on generals and generalship, economics, institutions, and “battle piece” examinations 
of combat.4 What Keegan proposes instead is for historians to broaden their scope and 
                                                        
3 “T-AH 19 Mercy Class,” https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/tah-19.htm.  
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attempt to see the “face of battle,” that is the experiences of the men on the ground who were 
asked to strain, suffer, and in many cases die, for their cause. Instead of discussing generals 
and battlefield tactics, Keegan instead examines “wounds and their treatment, the mechanics 
of being taken prisoner, the nature of leadership at the most junior level, the role of 
compulsion in getting men to stand their ground, the incidence of accidents as a cause of 
death in war and, above all, the dimensions of the danger which different varieties of 
weapons offer to the soldier on the battlefield.”5 The Face of Battle is a notable achievement 
because it introduced scholars to a "new" military history which allows historians to consider 
a wide range of topics apart from generalship and tactics. For this study, Keegan's work is 
significant because it was one of the earliest military histories to thoughtfully address 
battlefield casualties, as well as the mental and physical toll that warfare takes on the minds 
and bodies of its participants. And in the spirit of Keegan’s “new” military history, this work 
seeks to reveal more about the lives and personal experiences of those who served their 
countries in the field of battle. 
 Recently, the body of scholarship surrounding British and American military 
medicine in the First and Second World Wars has increased. In 2010, the leading voice in 
British military medicine during the twentieth century, Mark Harrison, published his work 
The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First World War in which he explains 
why medicine became so important to the conduct of war between 1914 and 1918. Harrison 
also argues that British military medicine improved dramatically during the war. He notes 
that the medical services were "clearly essential to military efficiency and their improvement 
                                                        
4 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 25-29. 
 
5 Keegan, The Face of Battle, 77. 
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was part and parcel of the vital managerial reforms undertaken by Douglas Haig during his 
period as commander-in-chief." One of the most striking elements of Harrison’s study, 
however, is its scope. Instead of focusing solely on the Western Front, Harrison examines a 
number of different theaters in hopes that this might permit “comparisons to be made 
between different theaters and the identification of those factors which had a bearing upon 
the success or failure of medical arrangements.”6  Another important element of Harrison’s 
work is his intermittent discussions of hospital ships. Of particular note are his examinations 
of British hospital ships during the Gallipoli landing.7  
 On the heels of Harrison’s study of battlefield medicine during World War I, two 
more works appeared in 2014—Emily Mayhew’s Wounded: A New History of the Western 
Front in World War I, followed by Christine E. Hallett’s Veiled Warriors: Allied Nurses of 
the First World War. Mayhew’s book can be neatly summarized by a sentence which appears 
in her introduction. Wounded is “a history of the central experience that was repeated 
hundreds of thousands of times up and down the Western Front and went beyond rank or 
status: the wounding of a soldier and the struggle of medics to save his life.” One key 
element that is mysteriously missing from her book is the hospital ship. In a work of 
scholarship that focuses on wounded soldiers and asserts that "The wounded spent a 
surprising amount of time on the move," one expects that hospital ships would be a major 
point of discussion. Instead, Mayhew focuses primarily on the land-based counterpart of the 
hospital ship: the hospital train. She notes, “The medical system relied on trains to move 
                                                        
6 Mark Harrison, The Medical War: British Medicine in the First World War, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 10-14. 
 
7 Harrison, The Medical War, 179-180. 
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large numbers of wounded around France and back home to Britain.”8 How these trains were 
able to cross the Channel from France to Britain is never explained.  
 Like Harrison’s The Medical War, Hallett’s Veiled Warriors looks at the service of 
Allied nurses across a broad spectrum of combat theaters. Although Hallett admits that her 
history is “a partial and distorted one, written by an English-speaking historian from a highly 
Anglocentric perspective,” she attempts to recount the experiences of a vast sample of Allied 
nurses from Britain, France, Belgium, Russia, Romania, Australia, South Africa, New 
Zealand, Canada, and the United States.9 Her work is an attempt to dispel the myths 
surrounding combat nurses of the First World War who were often seen as little more than 
self-sacrificing heroines, romantic foils to the male combatant, and doctor’s handmaidens. 
Hallett argues that these women were trained professionals who should be appreciated for 
performing significant work in their own right.10 One of the great benefits of the work is that 
her broad geographical focus across multiple fronts allows her to include a brief section 
examining the role of Allied hospital ships in the Eastern Mediterranean. In only a handful of 
pages, Hallett offers many lurid accounts from nurses who were aboard those vessels and 
gained first-hand experience of combat by practicing medicine on the front lines. 
 Concerning scholarship that examines military hospital ships more specifically, some 
of the earliest works appeared on the pages of the British Medical Journal before and during 
the First World War. Military minds and Royal Navy personnel constantly pondered ways to 
improve seaborne medical care and ensure that battlefield casualties could be swiftly and 
                                                        
8 Emily Mayhew, Wounded: A New History of the Western Front in World War I (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 3-4. 
 
9 Christine E. Hallett, Veiled Warriors: Allied Nurses in the First World War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), vii. 
 
10 Hallett, Veiled Warriors, 2-3. 
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safely evacuated. Since the close of the Second World War, however, two key works focus 
on the role of hospital ships in twentieth-century warfare and are vital building blocks upon 
which this study is constructed. These works are Emory A. Massman’s 1999 work, Hospital 
Ships of World War II: An Illustrated Reference and J.H. Plumridge’s Hospital Ships and 
Ambulance Trains.11 While not a professionally trained historian, Massman’s interest in 
hospital ships began during his time of naval service in the Second World War and grew 
while conducting research for his retirement hobby of model ship building. His fascination 
ultimately led to this work which manages to fit the history of each of America’s 39 World 
War II-era hospital ships into a single 450 page volume. While this reference work is useful 
to historians for identifying individual ships and uncovering a bit of surface-level information 
regarding their conversion into floating hospitals, renaming, and wartime activities, that is, 
unfortunately, where its utility ends. Throughout the work, Massman fails to provide 
citations but instead lists all of his reference materials in a bibliography without specifying 
which source corresponds with a particular piece of information in the text. Furthermore, his 
list of primary source materials is limited to eight manuscripts and a dozen of his own 
personal correspondences which makes it difficult for other interested historians to trace his 
references back to the source. Finally, Massman does not attempt to answer historical 
questions surrounding hospital ships in combat, nor does he provide any detailed assessments 
of hospital ships before World War II, or after. Nonetheless, it is still an important work in 
that it provides a solid foundation upon which future studies can attempt to build and expand. 
                                                        
11 Emory A. Massman, Hospital Ships of World War II: An Illustrated Reference to 39 United States Military 
Vessels (Jefferson, NC: McFarland Press, 1999); John H. Plumridge, Hospital Ships and Ambulance Trains 
(London: Seeley, 1975). 
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 John Plumridge’s analysis of hospital ships and ambulance trains is one of the earliest 
attempts to understand these vital components of military history. While he seems to spend 
more time assessing the importance of Great Britain’s ambulance trains and praising their 
gradual improvement through the course First World War, he mentions the use of hospital 
transports during the Crimean War and recounts the tale of the ill-fated Llandovery Castle. 
Like Massman, Plumridge does not seek to answer any historical questions surrounding the 
use of military hospital ships in combat. In the same way, his work represents an opening 
word on the subject and is, therefore, an appropriate foundation upon which to build the 
present study. 
 In addition to its primary focus on military and medical history, this study will also 
incorporate threads of an emerging historical discipline known as environmental history. 
Environmental history began in the 1960s and 70s and has since blossomed into a rather 
large field. In the short time since its inception, practitioners of environmental history have 
managed to assemble a relatively robust body of scholarship whose focus spans across 
numerous topics and historical periods. In the last several decades, environmental historians 
and military historians have slowly made their way towards merging their research interests 
and have begun conducting research on the relationships that exist between warfare and the 
natural world.  
For the purposes of the present study, considering the impact that environmental 
factors had on the development and use of hospital ships is exceeding useful. In many of the 
conflicts that this work surveys, illness from disease often proved more deadly than wounds 
sustained by enemy bullets. At the same time, unique environmental factors like geography, 
climate, and terrain made it difficult for British or American invasion forces to establish 
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adequate medical treatment facilities on land. As a result, ocean-going hospital ships were 
absolutely necessary as a means for combating the invisible army known as the 
environment.12 
The global wars of the early twentieth century represented the “golden age” of Anglo-
American hospital ships. By the end of World War II these vessels, as they had developed 
over the previous century and a half, had turned from bastions to burdens and were no longer 
viable options for wide-scale use in combat operations. For this reason, it is imperative that 
the history of these ships, as well as the stories of those who worked on them and whose lives 
they saved, be told. During the intense fighting that took place in the first half of the 
twentieth century, hospital ships helped save hundreds of thousands of lives. As soldiers 
rushed headlong into battle, fully prepared to transverse the fires of hell and defiantly stare 
down death, they could rest assured in the knowledge that hospital ships stood behind them, 
ready to pluck them from the fires and ferry them to safety.  
 
 
 
                                                        
12 For more on the environmental history of warfare, see Judith A. Bennett, Natives and Exotics: World War II 
and Environment in the Southern Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009); Lisa Brady, War upon 
the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern Landscapes during the American Civil War 
(Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012); Charles E. Closmann, ed., War and the Environment: Military 
Destruction in the Modern Age (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2009); Simo Laakkonen, 
Richard Tucker, and Timo Vuorisalo, eds, The Long Shadows: A Global Environmental History of the Second 
World War (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2017); Richard P. Tucker and Edmund Russell, 
eds. Natural Enemy, Natural Ally: Toward an Environmental History of Warfare (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State 
University Press, 2004); Richard P. Tucker, Tait Keller, J.R. McNeil, and Martin Schmid., eds, Environmental 
Histories of the First World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); H.A. Winters, Battling the 
Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
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Chapter One: The Historical Development of Anglo-American Hospital Ships 
For millennia, a close relationship has existed between medicine and the sea. As 
Zachary Friedenberg recounts in the opening paragraphs of his study on medicine in the age 
of sail, “In the Trojan wars, when Menelaus was wounded by a Trojan bowman, his brother 
and fleet commander Agamemnon sent for his fleet surgeon, Machaon, the son of 
Aesculapius, the god of medicine, to treat the wound.” Furthermore, some evidence suggests 
that the ancient navies of the Mediterranean understood the need for medical treatment 
facilities in combat and, therefore, designated some of their ships as floating hospitals.1 
Medical vessels, which one hesitates to label "hospital ships," occasionally appear 
throughout the more modern historical record as well. For instance, in 1588 the famed 
Spanish Armada included two medical ships with a displacement of 30 seamen, 100 soldiers, 
and 50 trained physicians.  
 Britain christened her first proto-hospital ship, Goodwill, in 1608, and during the 
Second Dutch War of 1664, two medical ships served in the fleet.2 Like their successors in 
the twentieth century, early hospital ships were often converted gunboats; outfitted to serve 
as medical treatment facilities. However, Friedenberg notes that "Some surgeons disapproved 
of hospital ships, believing that an ill sailor received better treatment on his own vessel, 
where he was known and supported by his mates." He argues, "No nation during the 
centuries of sailing vessels was wholeheartedly committed to the idea of a hospital ship."3 
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While this may have been the case, a closer examination of early medical vessels, as well as 
the ideas surrounding them, is useful for understanding why later hospital ships evolved in 
the ways that they did. 
 One of the main philosophies of medical ships that emerged during the age of sail 
was the need for adequate ventilation below deck. On December 4, 1741, well known British 
physician and scientist, Sir William Watson, penned a response to an idea put forth by a 
fellow scientist, David Sutton concerning the importance of ventilation in the lower decks of 
ships. At the time, professional physicians accepted the miasmatic theory as medical fact. 
According to the Dictionary of Public Health, the miasmatic theory held that sickness 
derived from “miasma, an ill-defined emanation from rotting organic matter.”4 To combat the 
presence of bad air on ships, and in turn protect the health of its sailors, Sutton proposed an 
invention “to extract the foul and stinking air from the well and other parts of ships.” In his 
observation of Sutton's suggestion, Watson argued: "As nothing is more conducive to the 
health of the human body than taking a sufficient quantity of wholesome air into the lungs, so 
the contrary is attended with pernicious and often destructive consequences."5 Eighteenth-
century ideas about miasmatic theory informed the conversion process of gunboats to 
hospital ships. The only steps necessary in the conversion process was the addition of 
ventilation grating in the vessel’s hull and the installation of partitions in the hold to prevent 
the spread of bad air among ailing sailors.6 During the age of sail, two major contributing 
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factors required Great Britain to include hospital ships in their military framework– empire 
and warfare. 
 In the two centuries immediately predating World War I, Great Britain enjoyed the 
largest empire on Earth. Maintaining that empire, however, often required the movement of 
large numbers of troops to engage in military action within the colonies. This often created a 
problem of overcrowding which, in turn, increased the likelihood of disease. To remedy this 
problem, the Royal Navy supplied hospital ships. While these ships were intended to stave 
off the spread of disease among the healthy sailors, they often lacked proper medical 
facilities, and many did not even carry a physician on board. In 1739, a physician 
accompanying Lord Cathcart’s campaign in the West Indies recounted his experience aboard 
one of the hospital ships: “The men were pent up between the decks in small vessels where 
they had not room to sit upright; they wallowed in filth; myriads of maggots were hatched in 
the putrefaction of their sores, which had no other dressings than that of being washed in 
their own allowance of brandy.” In the following decades, accounts like these promoted 
reforms in British naval medicine. In addition to ventilation and the expulsion of miasmatic 
air, surgeons, most notably James Lind, advocated the use of soap among seamen, the 
addition of lime juice in sailor’s diets to combat scurvy, and the use of chemical disinfectants 
to sanitize ship compartments.7 
 The second contributing factor that promoted the modernization of British hospital 
ships was warfare. Emory Massman argues that “the development of hospital ships became 
necessary with the increasing occurrences of war, which by its very nature wounds and kills 
warriors.” He further asserts that “Public opinion no longer tolerated throwing mortally 
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wounded men overboard” solve logistical problems of casualties littering the deck, a practice 
common among navies during this period.8 These statements seem to suggest that early 
hospital ships were necessary for the successful execution of warfare because they provided a 
more appropriate place of disposal for sick and wounded combatants whose care would have 
presented a substantial burden on board a warship. Further illustrating the close connection 
between hospital ships and war, Milt Riske commented that “Hospital ships are children of 
necessity, mothered and fathered by wars.”9 For Great Britain, their experiences in the 
Crimean War and Second Opium War taught them valuable lessons concerning hospital ships 
and military medicine at large.  
 The Crimean War lasted from October 1853 to March 1856. Unfolding in the Balkans 
of southeastern Europe, the war pitted an alliance of Great Britain, France, and the Ottoman 
Empire against powers of Tsar Nicholas I, and later Alexander II, controlling the forces of 
the Russian Empire. It was the first major international war following the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815 and a fight to balance power in the region. The Ottomans were fighting to 
defend themselves from Russian invasion while Great Britain and France sought to defend, 
and further, their interests in the region.10 In the end, the Allied forces were able to defeat the 
Russian Empire, but the legacy of the war is one tainted by gross mismanagement at the 
tactical, logistical and medical levels. With the introduction of telegraph technology, British 
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press correspondence could quickly relay information back to people on the home front. 
Occasionally, news of mismanagement incited passionate responses in the papers. In one 
instance, an editorial in The Times strongly rebuked Britain’s failed system of management 
asking “Where, let us ask, was the profit of the outlay or exertions by which bales upon bales 
of stores were sent to rot at Balaklava? If they could neither be housed, nor stored, nor 
distributed, they might evidently have just as well been taken up to the top of Dover cliffs 
and pitched into the sea.”11 Some of these derelictions, specifically regarding the 
management of battlefield casualties, ultimately precipitated vast reforms in British nursing 
and enhanced the need for the British military to adopt hospital ships in the following 
decades.  
 Conditions during the Crimean War were horrendous on all sides. Evidence suggests 
that infection killed more soldiers than bullets or sabers as preventative measures such as 
antibiotics did not appear until the twentieth century.12 This meant that military physicians 
were faced with very few means with which to combat the spread of infectious disease. To 
make matters worse, British soldiers who fell sick or wounded on the Crimean Peninsula 
were treated at the base hospital at Scutari, some 300 miles away from the battlefield, in the 
Bosporus Strait. Soldiers completed the journey across the Black Sea crammed into the holds 
of hospital ships. Many, however, would not survive the voyage. Records from the hospital 
ship Shooting Star indicate that 47 of her 103 passengers died on the journey from Balaklava 
to Scutari.13 
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Moreover, those who made it to the base hospital could expect little improvement in 
their condition. As one scholar asserts, "[The Scutari] hospitals existed largely to segregate 
patients with fever from their healthy compatriots. Soldiers were not sent to Scutari to be 
healed so much as to die.” In her memoir, Nurse Sarah Terrot recalled how “one poor fellow 
neglected by the orderlies because he was dying...was very dirty, covered with wounds, and 
devoured by lice. I pointed this out to the orderlies, whose only excuse was, ‘It's not 
worthwhile to clean him: he's not long for this world.’”14 Like the miserable conditions 
reported aboard British medical vessels in the eighteenth century, the environment of base 
hospitals and hospital ships during the Crimean War prompted numerous reforms.  
 One of the most notable figures to emerge from the Crimean War was British nurse 
Florence Nightingale. Considered by many to be the founder of modern nursing, Nightingale 
was instrumental in modernizing medicine in Britain. During the first year of conflict, 
Nightingale was volunteering as a nurse in London amidst a city-wide cholera outbreak. It 
was there that Nightingale developed specific ideas about nursing that she took with her to 
Scutari in November 1854. Believing that patients would fare better if they were well-fed, 
comfortable, and clean, she set to work against the three things which she believed destroyed 
the British forces in Crimea–"ignorance, incapacity, and useless rules."15 Nightingale based 
each of her reforms on a single principle: cleanliness. She made sure that casualties 
disembarking the hospital ships in Scutari received fresh linens, as opposed to the previous 
system of reusing soiled linens. She developed a prototypical system of triaging patients to 
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ensure the maximum potential for survival for those in critical states. Finally, she promoted 
an increase in overall hygiene by removing human waste from the wards each day as well as 
intermittently laundering soldiers bed linens and clothes. While Florence Nightingale could 
not save every casualty that entered the Scutari hospital during the war, her forward-thinking 
approach to medicine influenced its application in both the private and the military sectors.16  
 While the Crimean War raged in the Balkans and Florence Nightingale was busy 
catapulting military medicine into the modern age, more troops of the expansive British 
Empire prepared for conflict in the far reaches of East Asia. Beginning in October of 1856, 
the Second Opium War matched British and French forces against troops from China’s Qing 
Dynasty. It occurred as a result of British dissatisfaction with the opium trade, which they 
opened with China following the First Opium War, which lasted from 1839 to 1842. While it 
was a notable moment in the diplomatic and economic histories of China and Great Britain, it 
was also an important milestone in the history of British hospital ships. In 1860, as fighting 
came to a close, Great Britain introduced the world's first steam-powered hospital ships, 
HMS Mauritius and HMS Melbourne. The impressive amenities and medical capabilities of 
these vessels laid the framework upon which future Anglo-American hospital ships were 
constructed. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Opium Wars, they became shining 
examples of the need for such vessels as a permanent part of the fleet. 
 On January 21, 1860, The Illustrated London News published an article titled, 
“Hospital Ships for China.” In what is one of the few surviving descriptions of the two 
vessels, the article illustrates the ships and recounts how the British government had been 
working to supply ships for the expedition to China. It notes that “Besides the Himalaya and 
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a number of other large vessels for the conveyance of troops, ammunition, and stores, two 
splendid screw steam-ships have been specially equipped and fitted out in the most complete 
manner as hospital ships. They are the Melbourne and Mauritius, each registering over 2000 
tons.” It goes on to describe many amenities aboard the ship that signal major advancements 
from the earlier hospital ships of the Crimean War. The Melbourne had enough beds to hold 
120 patients and 20 crewmembers and in keeping with some familiar ideas about naval 
medicine, “The greatest attention has been paid to ventilation of this part of the ship.” In 
addition to the comfortable bays in which to house her casualties, Melbourne was also fitted 
with a state-of-the-art operating room "judiciously placed in the centre of the ship, having a 
large skylight over it which admits plenty of light for the surgeons and dispensers of 
medicine.” Finally, the cover of the skylight was removable, “and directly underneath it 
stands the operating table; so that wounded men requiring surgical aid may be passed through 
the opening on the main deck directly to it.” Concerning the Mauritius, the article notes that 
“the general arrangements are much the same,” and that “both ships reflect the highest credit 
on their captains and officers.”17 
Melbourne and Mauritius ushered in the age of the modern hospital ship. At the same 
time, they demonstrated the potential for using medical vessels in combat. In 1862, the 
British Medical Journal published an article reflecting on the medical history of The Opium 
Wars. In this reflection, one of the major highlights was “the inauguration of two noble 
hospital ships,” both fitted out with “the finest medical and surgical appliances the finest 
London hospitals possess.” The article also boasts of the “the unspeakable advantage to an 
army on active service of being attended by hospital ships of the size and equipment of the 
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Mauritius and Melbourne.” The ships made such a deep impression that a Dr. Muir submitted 
“that they should form a constituent part of the hospital equipment of [the British] army.”     
However, the age of modernity was not confined within the bounds of Great Britain. 
It stretched across the Atlantic to the United States. In the same decade that Britain 
introduced its new hospital ships, American medical vessels experienced a renaissance of 
their own. While the age of sail had not necessarily witnessed the emergence of categorical 
hospital ships, constant development in military and maritime medicine through the course of 
the Crimean and Opium Wars led to the appearance of bonafide hospital ships beginning in 
the 1860s. In the same way, the Civil War helped promote the emergence of American 
hospital ships that had a great deal of influence on their predecessors in the twentieth 
century.18 
 The Civil War was an experience in which, for the first time, the American military 
had to deal with a massive number of battlefield casualties and they faced Larson’s 
“perennial problem.” Like their twentieth-century successors, some hospital ships during the 
Civil War also referred to as hospital transports, operated under the command of the navy 
while the army oversaw others. However, the responsibility for these vessels was also 
divided between three entities: the U.S. Sanitary Commission in Washington, D.C., the 
Western Sanitary Commission in St. Louis, Missouri (both forerunners of the American Red 
Cross), and the Quartermaster’s Medical Department. President Abraham Lincoln created the 
U.S. Sanitary Commission on June 13, 1861, and placed Frederick Law Olmstead at its helm. 
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Serving under the War Department, the Sanitary Commission was responsible for aid and 
relief of wounded and sick military personnel.19  
 It was during this period, and under the guidance of Olmsted’s Commission, that 
American hospital ships took the first steps toward modernity and began developing and 
transforming into the vessels that would appear in twentieth-century combat. Jack McCallum 
asserts that “The use of hospital ships began after the Battle of Belmont (November 7, 1861) 
in Missouri.” The use of water transport was necessary for there were no hospitals nearby, 
rail transportation was unavailable, and road conditions were poor. He argues, “Although 
transport by water was faster and less traumatic than bouncing along rutted dirt roads, 
conditions were far from ideal.” John Haller elaborates on these conditions in his history of 
military medicine during the Civil War. He explains that hospital transports were indeed a 
convenient means for transporting casualties, but lacked key elements of comfort. For 
example, in the eastern theater, many hospital transports did not even have mattresses. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that complications from hospital gangrene were 
commonplace as a result of the boat's dampness and overcrowded conditions. From this, it is 
difficult for one to see how these ships were dissimilar from their earlier British counterparts 
which acted as floating barges of suffering for the convalescing instead of sanctuaries of 
repose.20  
 In 1863, the Sanitary Commission released a report to the general public regarding 
their hospital transport program titled, A Memoir of the Embarkation of the Sick and 
Wounded from the Peninsula of Virginia in the Summer of 1862. The authors expressed their 
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hope that their “little volume” would influence the public and lead them “to truly 
comprehend what the rebellion costs.” While at the same time, inculcate “a right spirit of 
humane provision against the unnecessary suffering of war.”21 This compilation of letters, 
penned by six Commission members who served aboard the Union hospital transport Daniel 
Webster, is a vital piece of evidence to assist in understanding how American militaries of 
the nineteenth century relied, in part, on hospital transports to evacuate the massive volume 
of battlefield casualties that they experienced.  
 The environment of the eastern United States shaped the Union, and Confederate 
armies need for hospital transports. As we will see in Chapter 2, environmental 
circumstances often necessitated the presence of a floating hospital where topography made 
it difficult to establish field hospitals. During the Civil War, however, the Commission’s 
report asserts, “A sudden transfer of the scene of active war from the high banks of the 
Potomac to a low and swampy region, intersected with a net-work of rivers and creeks, early 
in the summer of 1862, required appliances for the proper care of the sick and wounded 
which did not appear to have been contemplated in the government’s arrangements.” In order 
to remedy this deficiency, the Commission approached the office of the Quartermaster-
General and requested to utilize a number of transport steamboats from his department which 
had been lying idle. The Commission received their first vessel, the Daniel Webster, on April 
25, 1862. Daniel Webster was a former Pacific Coast steamer with a small capacity but was 
strong enough to make the ocean passage from Virginia to New York or Boston. Once 
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refitted for service as a hospital transport, she was ready to begin receiving battlefield 
casualties.22 
 Daniel Webster received her first patients on May 3, 1862. At nightfall, the sick and 
wounded men were delivered to the transport aboard the Wilson Small, “a boat of light 
draught, fitted up as a little hospital, to run up creeks and bring down sick and wounded to 
the transports.”23 As one of the Commission members recalled, each of the thirty-five 
patients was "carefully lifted on board and swung through the hatches on their stretchers. In 
half an hour they had all been tea’d and coffeed and refreshed by the nurses, and shortly after 
were all undressed and put to bed clean and comfortable, in a droll state of grateful 
wonder.”24 However, not everyone who found themselves aboard the Daniel Webster had 
such pleasant experiences. A letter from an anonymous member of the Sanitary Commission 
recalled that one evening came aboard “the sickest men I ever saw,–crazy and noisy, soaked, 
body and mind, with swamp-poison, and in a sort of delirious remembrance of the days 
before the fever came,– days of mortal chill and hunger,– screaming for food, for something 
‘hot,’ for ‘lucifer matches’ even.”25 In another instance, the Union transport Ocean Queen 
was on its way to the mouth of the York River to be turned over to the Sanitary Commission 
for conversion. When she arrived, however, she was loaded with 900 typhoid patients. To 
make matters worse, the vessel was entirely devoid of medical equipment and food. These 
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accounts illustrate the often varying conditions aboard a hospital transport during the Civil 
War.26   
In the western theater, the Quartermaster’s Medical Department recognized the 
potential of the Mississippi River and its tributaries to act as a natural network for hospital 
transports. Thus, they quickly began refitting river steamboats with hospital facilities. The 
number of casualties that these ships transported is often staggering. Out of this handful of 
extraordinary hospital transports, two ships, the D.A. January and City of Louisiana, stand 
out. The D.A. January, in particular, is notable not only for the number of casualties she was 
able to transport, but also for her advanced design which was undoubtedly influenced by her 
eighteenth-century predecessors, and inspired those vessels that followed in her wake.   
The U.S. Navy purchased D.A. January in April 1862. She was the first hospital ship 
purchased by the American military. D.A. January began her life in 1857 and served as a 
passenger riverboat in St. Louis before undergoing conversion into a hospital ship. After the 
conversion, she could carry 150 beds in each of her three wards as well as house patients 
under awnings on her deck. Her original architectural drawings also suggest that there were 
laundry facilities onboard, as well as steam-powered fans that helped provide adequate 
ventilation in the spaces below deck. Also, the ship featured pipes which passed through ice 
chests to provide cold water from the tap. Finally, the transport boasted a spacious operating 
room which was certainly uncommon for hospital ships in that era. The ship’s mortality rate 
best demonstrates the efficacy of these amenities. In the aftermath of the Battle of Shiloh, 
D.A. January transported six loads of wounded from Pittsburg Landing north to hospitals in 
St. Louis and Keokuk, Iowa. Through the course of her wartime service, D.A. January 
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transported 23,738 battlefield casualties to hospitals along the Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois 
rivers with a mortality rate of only 2.3%. 
Similarly, Union hospital transport R.C. Wood (previously known as the City of 
Louisiana) proved extremely useful in combat. In a two year period, from April 1863 to 
April 1865, it managed to travel some 34,800 miles. Across thirty-three trips, it carried 
11,024 sick and wounded between New Orleans, Vicksburg, Memphis, St. Louis, and 
Louisville.27  
These two vessels represent an enormous evolution of hospital ships during the period 
of the American Civil War. While smaller transports in the east certainly made a 
considerable impact to those whom they saved, the larger transports of the west are more 
appropriate examples of the direction in which the American hospital ship program was 
trending. One vessel, however, the Red Rover, eclipsed both the D.A. January and City of 
Louisiana in terms of size and amenities. Red Rover, in conjunction with Great Britain’s 
Melbourne and Mauritius, represents the final step in the evolution of hospital ships from 
small, sail-powered vessels where casualties went to die, to massive floating hospitals, 
capable of efficiently transporting and treating large numbers of casualties. They represent a 
link between the hospital ships of the mid-nineteenth century and those appearing before the 
Great War.   
In December 1863, The Wisconsin State Register called Red Rover “one of the finest 
floating hospitals in the United States,”28 and her journey to achieving such high praise was 
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notable. Red Rover began her life as a side-wheel river steamer in the Confederate States of 
America. She was captured by the Union gunboat Mound City while serving as a floating 
barracks during the Battle of Island Number 10. Following her capture, she was sent to St. 
Louis to undergo conversion into a hospital transport for the Union. Like her counterparts in 
Great Britain, Red Rover was fit with several modern amenities. First, the ship covered its 
windows with gauze to act as a screen against ash and smoke. At the same time, the 
permeable material would not present an impediment to the ship's ventilation. Red Rover 
could also hold 300 tons of ice, which chilled the water and cooled the wards. Finally, she 
boasted a fully equipped operating room, an elevator to move patients between decks, and a 
small group of volunteer nurses from the Catholic Sisters of the Holy Cross. These women 
were the first to serve in such a capacity in the U.S. Navy.29  
 Unlike Melbourne and Mauritius, however, Red Rover had a 32-pounder gun 
mounted to the bow to help defend her from any potential threats. Postbellum changes to 
international laws regarding hospital ships mandated that they sail unarmed in order to 
benefit from legal protection against their enemies. However, the lack of such restraints 
during the Civil War made it legal for hospital transports to carry weapons. Evidence 
estimates that during her two and a half years of service on the Mississippi, Ohio, 
Cumberland, and Tennessee Rivers, Red Rover transported nearly 1,700 wounded soldiers 
and suffered a total of only 151 deaths.30  
The American hospital transports which appeared during the Civil War are estimated 
to have carried a total of approximately 150,000 Union casualties from 1862 to 1865. In the 
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south, the Confederate government was never able to establish a system of hospital transports 
successfully. While it is difficult to draw any concrete conclusions about the impact that 
Union hospital transports may have had on the outcome of the conflict, the experiences and 
lessons learned by the military during the Civil War helped sow the initial seeds of what 
would eventually sprout into large-scale maritime medicine in the United States.31 
Hospital Ships and International Law 
The physical development of hospital ships, however, would have meant very little if 
world leaders had not worked to establish international laws that protected these vulnerable 
vessels from enemy combatants. International laws and treaties addressing military and 
civilian conduct during times of conflict have a rich history dating back to ancient 
civilizations. Many historians and legal scholars have addressed the development and impact 
that these agreements have had. International law concerning hospital ships, however, did not 
appear until the turn of the twentieth century at the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 and 
the Geneva Conventions during those same years. In many cases, these conventions covered 
much of the same ground and influenced one another in their approach to dealing with 
hospital ships. Nonetheless, the protections that these laws afforded to military hospital ships 
were critical to their successful application in the world wars and, therefore, must be 
understood.32 
Most legal scholars and political philosophers agree that the Hague Conventions of 
1899 were based mainly on the Lieber Code, issued by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863, 
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and the First Geneva Conventions of 1864.33 Both of these earlier attempts sought only to 
apply humanitarian law to armed conflict within their own geographical proximities, the 
United States and Western Europe, respectively. Alternatively, the Hague Conventions of 
1899 hoped to institute humanitarian law in armed conflicts on a more global scale. Drawing 
on these earlier attempts, The Hague Conventions of 1899 addressed several topics of 
supreme military importance. Apart from hospital ships, world leaders considered the legality 
of using asphyxiating gas and expanding bullets on the battlefield, as well as utilizing 
balloons to drop projectiles and explosives.34 
Convention III of the Hague Conventions of 1899, titled “For the adaptation to 
maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864,” is most 
important for understanding the development of laws meant to protect military hospital ships. 
The Convention of 1864 focused on the “amelioration of the condition of the wounded in 
armies in the field.” The Hague Convention of 1899 merely extended those protections of 
land warfare to war on the seas. Of the 14 Articles related to hospital ships, five are 
particularly important in helping to understand the various protections afforded to hospital 
ships. First, and perhaps most notably, Article I provides the inceptive formal definition of 
military hospital ships and briefly outlines the conditions of their immunity from attack by 
enemy combatants: 
Military hospital ships, that is to say, ships constructed or assigned by States specially 
and solely for the purpose of assisting the wounded, sick or shipwrecked, and the 
names  of which shall have been communicated to the belligerent Powers at the 
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beginning or during the course of hostilities, and in any case before they are 
employed, shall be respected and can not be captured while hostilities last.35  
 
Article II extended these same protections to private hospital ships– namely, those operated 
by international Red Cross or Red Crescent organizations– but added that those ships should 
be “furnished with a certificate from the competent authorities, declaring that they have been 
under their control while fitting out and on final departure.” Likewise, Article III further 
extended these protections to hospital ships of neutral countries, provided they meet the 
definition outlined in Article I. Article IV requires that “the ships mentioned in Articles I, II 
and III shall afford relief and assistance to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked of the 
belligerents independently of their nationality.” It also mandates that “The [warring parties] 
engage not to use these ships for any military purpose,” and that “[Hospital ships] must not in 
any way hamper the movements of the combatants.” Additionally, it warns that “During and 
after an engagement they will act at their own risk and peril.” Finally, the article conveys the 
rights of belligerents and asserts that they will have a "right to control and visit [hospital 
ships]; they can refuse to 
help them, order them off, 
make them take a certain 
course, and put a 
commissioner on board; 
they can even detain them, 
if important circumstances 
require it.”36  
                                                        
35 Brown, The Hague Conventions, 164. 
 
Figure 1.2 America's first purpose-built hospital ship, USS Relief (AH-1), 
showing the distinguishing marks of a designated hospital ship. Source: U.S. 
Navy Naval History and Heritage Command (Photo #80-G-K-3708). 
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  In the same way that Article I is crucial for defining military hospital ships, Article V 
is critical because it outlines the distinguishing features that military hospitals had to adopt in 
order to be readily detectable and therefore protected from attack by enemy combatants 
(Figure 1.2).  The article requires military hospital ships to distinguish themselves “by being 
painted white outside with a horizontal band of green about a meter and a half in breadth.” 
The ships mentioned in Article II and III (being private ships or ships of neutral countries) 
should be distinguished with the same white exterior, but with a band of red rather than 
green. In order to further promote visibility and detectability, the ships lifeboats and other 
small crafts were to be emblazoned with the same distinguishing features. Lastly, Article V 
ordered that “All hospital ships shall make themselves known by hoisting, together with their 
national flag, the white flag with a red cross provided by the Geneva Convention.”37 
  The protections afforded to military hospital ships by the Hague Conventions of 1899 
were subsequently amended in 1907, as advances in military technology required renewed 
conversations on specific topics like chemical weapons and modified ammunition. 
Amendments to the articles concerning hospital ships were scarce but still noteworthy. For 
instance, an amendment to Article V obligated all military hospital ships, who wished to 
“ensure by night the freedom from interference to which they are entitled,” to burn all of 
their lights in order to “render their special painting specifically plain.” Article VII, which 
originally protected the lives, freedom, and personal property of any religious, medical, or 
hospital staff on board, was altered to include provisions to protect sick wards, "in the case of 
a fight on board a warship." Likewise, a 1907 amendment to Article VIII, initially requiring 
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hospital ships to care for and protect any casualty they brought aboard, regardless of 
allegiance, stated that "Hospital ships and sick wards of vessels are no longer entitled to 
protection if they are employed for the purpose of injuring the enemy.”38 
 In other words, hospital ships carrying arms, munitions, troops, or other matériel of 
war forfeited their protections under international law and were fair targets for enemy 
belligerents. This amendment, in particular, could often prove troublesome for Anglo-
American hospital ships as it provided a convenient pretext for overly suspicious enemies to 
impede, pursue, and in some cases destroy, their defenseless victims– as was the case with 
HMS Llandovery Castle in the summer of 1918. As these laws reveal, hospital ships were 
unique vessels with unique responsibilities and, therefore, required different protections.39 
Hospital Ships during the Spanish-American War 
  The final decade of the nineteenth century witnessed massive developments not only 
in American hospital ships but in the navy at large. In his short history of the U.S Navy, 
maritime historian Craig Symonds argues that the 1890s were a time of significant growth for 
the American fleet. He attributes this progress to three things. First, Congress allocated 
funding for the construction of three top of the line battleships–Indiana, Massachusetts, and 
Oregon. The introduction of these ships among the Navy's fleet was a critical step towards 
modernization. The second contributing factor to the rapid rise of America’s power was the 
publication of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 
Mahan suggested that possession of a large battleship fleet was vital in allowing Great 
Britain to capture and consolidate the most expansive and powerful empire on the planet. To 
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better understand this, one must look at Symond’s final point: the U.S. Census report of 
1890. According to him, the 1890 census revealed that America’s western frontier had 
vanished and the only potential for growth was to adopt a national attitude of imperialism 
and plant the American flag on foreign soil. For these aspirations, Mahan supplied the 
blueprint. For the nation to develop, the navy had to develop with it. The period of the 
Spanish-American War played an important part of this evolution. During this era, American 
military hospital ships entered a new age; one which would prepare them for use in the 
following decades.40 
  The Spanish-American War began on February 15, 1898, in Cuba, when an explosion 
in her hold sent the Maine and 260 Americans to the bottom of Havana Harbor. While the 
explosion is believed to have been caused by the detonation of coal dust in the bunker, many 
imperialist-minded Americans used the incident as a pretext for war with Spain, a former 
world power that was quickly in decline. They advocated war in hopes of expanding 
American interests in the Caribbean as well as other parts of the world. On April 21, 
American ships established a blockade of Cuba. On the 25th, Congress officially declared war 
on Spain. In the four day interim, however, American hospital ships took a big leap toward 
modernity, when the Navy commissioned the former Creole as its first USS Solace (AH-2). 
The American military approach to hospital ships would never be the same.41 
 Consistent with the approaches to military hospital ships which existed at the time of 
the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Navy purchased the ocean steam liner Creole from the 
Cromwell Line on April 7, 1898 in order to convert it into a hospital ship. The conversion 
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process took place in Norfolk, VA and lasted only 16 days. While Solace was not the first 
American hospital ship to appear in the 1890s, as she was barely beaten out by USS Relief 
(AH-1), Solace was the first American hospital ship to hoist the flag of the Geneva 
Convention and carry it into battle with a foreign enemy. This event is an essential milestone 
in the history of American hospital ships. From then on, the declarations of international law 
protected these vessels which were primarily concerned with providing humanitarian aid 
during the course of the fighting. Massman notes that “On its first trip out, the USS Solace 
(AH-2) brought back to Norfolk 400 wounded Spanish prisoners. The second trip returned 
with a full load of army men with yellow fever.” These accounts help illustrate what vital 
resources hospital ships represented. In all, the U.S. Army and Navy operated seven hospital 
ships in the course of the Spanish-American War. Like Solace (AH-2), many of the ships 
were converted passenger liners. One ship, SS Missouri, had even served as a cattle transport 
ship before her owner, B.M. Baker donated her to the U.S. government. While the ship was 
little more than an empty shell when the government received it, following a massive 
conversion effort, Missouri had facilities for 326 patients and 153 staff.42 
Another important emergence during the Spanish-American war was the first 
appearance of privately funded hospital ships. International law afforded privately funded 
hospital ships many of the same protections as those owned by the army and navy. The only 
difference was that privately funded ships were to paint a red band around their hull as 
opposed to the green paint of military vessels. A major proponent of these privately funded 
ships was Clara Barton and the American Red Cross (ARC). In the wake of the Civil War, 
Clara Barton was an outspoken advocate for the introduction of a Red Cross Society in the 
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United States. As sanitary commissions dissolved, other entities were needed to ensure 
humanitarian aid was available for American troops who became casualties of war. In 1881, 
Barton successfully established the American Red Cross and the organization contributed 
heavily during the Spanish-American War.43 
 Relying on her indomitable spirit, experience gained as a battlefield nurse during the 
Civil War, as well as a vast network of powerful political connections, including President 
William McKinley, Barton and the ARC were able to supply five hospital and hospital 
supply ships of their own. Like their military counterparts, the ARC’s hospital ships were 
converted from various types of passenger ships. During the conflict, these ships sailed back 
and forth from the U.S. to Cuba carrying medical supplies furnished by the ARC. There is no 
evidence to suggest that they, or the ships under military control, were ever threatened with 
hostilities during the fighting.44 
 From their earliest iterations as little more than floating warehouses of the dead and 
dying, to sophisticated, modern vessels with the capability to care for hundreds of casualties, 
hospital ships certainly made valuable contributions to powers engaged in warfare. 
Moreover, they neatly parallel the rise of modern medicine in the United States and Great 
Britain, and updates in medicine were crucial for continued progress in the development of 
hospital ships. These developments occurred just in time for the greatest conflict the world 
had ever known, the First World War. This conflicts represent the golden age of Britain’s 
hospital ships and their stories, as well as those who served and recovered aboard them, must 
be told.
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Chapter Two: British Hospital Ships in Global Combat, 1896-1918 
  
In 1915, Anne Donnell, a nursing sister of the Australian Army Nursing Services, 
found herself serving aboard a hospital ship in the far reaches of the eastern Mediterranean 
off the coast of a rocky peninsula called Gallipoli. With dreadful weather outdoors, Sister 
Anne sat quietly in her cabin waiting patiently to spring into action as the next batch of 
wounded soldiers made their way from the beaches of the peninsula to the hospital ship in the 
bay. After the war, Sister Anne sat down to write her recollections of her time in the service. 
In four years, she worked as an Allied nurse in places like Marseilles, Cairo, Malta, Lemnos, 
and Alexandria. It was her experience at Gallipoli, however, that left the most lasting impact 
on her.  
“In that terrible weather,” she wrote, “with wind travelling 100 miles an hour, and 
rain and sleet, all seems so pitifully hopeless…during those fearful days our thoughts were 
constantly with the boys of the Peninsula and wondering how they were faring; but little did 
we realize the sufferings until the winds abated and they began to arrive with their poor feet 
and hands frostbitten.” As Donnell recalled, hundreds of men were unable to crawl away to 
safety as their bodies were paralyzed from the cold. Sister Anne wrote that the soldiers at 
Gallipoli endured many agonies: “Sentries were found dead in their posts, frozen and still 
clutching their rifles…their fingers were too frozen to pull the trigger. And some we have in 
hospital are losing both feet, some both hands.” Ending her remarks, Donnell remarked that 
the whole situation was “all too sad for words, hopelessly sad.”1 
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The fighting at Gallipoli during the First World War witnessed the most extensive use 
of British hospital ships during the first half of the twentieth century. Poor pre-battle 
planning and unique factors in the physical environment of the peninsula meant that hospital 
ships became responsible for evacuating and treating any soldier who fell from illness or 
enemy fire. They became incredibly important in the overall context of the battle. By the 
time of the Allied evacuation, in 1916, one could argue that the performance of their hospital 
ships were the only part of the campaign that worked in favor of Britain and her Dominions. 
Before assessing their performance at Gallipoli, however, it is useful for one to first look at 
pre-war theories of British medical vessels in order to understand how these ships were 
meant to operate in war zones. 
 
Pre-War Theories of British Hospital Ships 
Conversion or Purpose-Built? Two Opposing Views 
As the Spanish-American War loomed across the Atlantic and the American military 
was on the verge of realizing the potential application of modern medical vessels in combat, 
observers in Great Britain began advocating for the construction and inclusion of hospital 
ships as part of the Royal Navy’s fleet. One of the earliest, and perhaps most ardent, 
advocates for modernizing Britain’s approach to hospital ships was Dr. P. Murray 
Braidwood. In an 1896 article, published by the renowned British medical journal, The 
Lancet, Dr. Braidwood exposed the deficiencies present in the Royal Navy’s hospital ship 
program and presented a detailed plan, complete with illustrations, outlining his 
recommended alterations. While it is unclear precisely to what extent Braidwood’s 
recommendations shaped Great Britain’s hospital ship program in the years leading up to the 
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First World War, his article is critical necessary to gain a complete understanding of theories 
surrounding the development of twentieth-century hospital ships.2 
Braidwood set the stage for his article with a scathing review of Britain’s position in 
naval medicine arguing that the “ever-recurring screen of ignorance euphemistically termed 
‘experience’ obscures at present the state of our Naval Medical Service (NMS).” With his 
paper, Braidwood aimed to “point out a better way of preparedness to meet emergencies.” In 
his view, Britain had no good answer for medical evacuation if suddenly met with a war 
outside of their colonial sphere. At the time, Britain, like the United States, relied on the 
conversion system to supply their armed forces with hospital ships; a process which 
Braidwood believed required vast alteration. He railed against conversion arguing that when 
the British government declared war, “we meet our suddenly incurred responsibility by 
makeshifts.” The “makeshifts” to which Braidwood referred were passenger-carrying 
steamships from large shipping companies which the government subsidized “at an 
enormous cost” and then “knocked about (converted is the official phrase) to suit hospital 
purposes.” He underscored the unacceptability of this method by explaining that most of the 
passenger steamers were “often unwieldy, with corners, crevices, and angles of all 
descriptions admirably calculated to house and retain objectionable peculiarities, and often 
needing repair.”3 Braidwood believed that purpose-built hospital ships would help bolster the 
woefully unprepared NMS and used the remainder of his article to outline what he saw as the 
best approach to constructing them. 
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Braidwood first recognized the need for purpose-built hospital ships during the 
Anglo-Egyptian War of 1882 while analyzing the deficiencies of the NMS in the 
transportation and treatment of the wounded at sea. He argued that the NMS is "very 
expensive" and yet "seldom answers the purpose from want of a sufficient number of 
surgeons and nurses to supply the fleet and of the necessary room on board a fighting vessel 
for attending to the sick and wounded." The issue of treatment space aboard fighting ships as 
a justification for purpose-built hospital ships is one that would reappear in the decade prior 
to World War I. Braidwood also pointed out that "our first line of defense, our warships, is 
being supplemented, but no regard has yet been paid to affording necessary medical aid to 
those who may suffer when taking part in such defense.” For this purpose, Braidwood 
believed that hospital ships were an absolute necessity.4 
After a brief examination of the historical relationship between naval warfare and 
medicine, including a mention of the United States Sanitary Commission's significant 
contribution to wartime medicine during the American Civil War and the formation of Red 
Cross Societies, Braidwood began his most compelling arguments for the inclusion of 
purpose-built hospital ships as part of the Royal Navy. "The hospital ship," he wrote, "is to 
be regarded as an integral part of the fleet of war. It ought never to be wanting, and should 
accompany the fleet as the ambulance or field hospital the army. As long as hospital ships 
and rafts are wanting the NMS will be incomplete." While Braidwood’s plans to implement 
what he aptly called the Naval Ambulance Association (NAA) were certainly ambitious, it is 
important to remember that he published this paper before the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions and, therefore, cannot take into consideration those protections and restrictions 
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that international law would ultimately afford military hospital ships. As a result, 
Braidwood’s suggestion that the large, open-air upper deck of the ship could be “utilized for 
transporting infantry troops” would have ultimately violated international law.  
Braidwood also understood that some might question why the Royal Navy would 
suspend their conversion approach in favor of purpose-built hospital ships. He merely 
reminded them that "such vessels are very costly in their conversion from one line of work 
into another, and they cannot be as efficient as hospital ships arranged ab initio [from the 
beginning] and built for the purpose.” Finally, Braidwood further cemented his idea by 
pointing to the “well known and generally acknowledged” fact among medical professionals 
that “patients recover better when treated in a house specially arranged and built for the 
purpose. This holds equally true for the treatment of sick and wounded at sea. A passenger 
steamer converted into a hospital ship can never be equally efficient with a vessel arranged 
and built for this special purpose.”5 
Having outlined his case for the inclusion of purpose-built hospital ships in the NMS, 
what were Braidwood’s specific ideas for the layout and construction of these vessels? In 
what ways were they to differ from their prototypical forerunners, such as the Mauritius and 
Melbourne, which appeared during Britain's mid-nineteenth century wars? The first, and 
arguably the most critical, difference between Braidwood's more modern floating hospital 
and those of the 1860s was capacity. While Melbourne was capable of housing 120 patients 
and 20 crew members, Braidwood's proposed ship would afford accommodation for "250 
sick and wounded and [carry] sufficient stores to build and equip a temporary shore 
hospital." Next, the scale of Braidwood's ships would be considerably more significant than 
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that of its predecessors. Weighing 2000 tons each, Mauritius and Melbourne were indeed 
large vessels. 
 On the other hand, Braidwood's proposal called for ships that were 325 feet long, 50 
feet wide, and had a depth of 25 feet. Each ship's total tonnage would equal approximately 
3,722. Based on these figures, Braidwood intended Great Britain’s twentieth-century hospital 
ships to be near twice the size of their earlier adaptations. Even so, he assured readers that his 
proposed vessel would be “of light draught and would be able to ascend most rivers, so that if 
war were raging at a seaboard or near a large river or lake one of the steamers could sail up to 
a spot nearest the seat of battle and receive any sick and wounded, whilst it could also convey 
the necessaries for erecting on shore a hospital to accommodate 300 patients.” Here, yet 
again, Braidwood demonstrated why he believed purpose-built hospital ships were the 
obvious alternative to converted passenger steamers.6 
While the scale of Braidwood’s proposed hospital ships was certainly grander than 
those previous vessels, there were also important similarities and differences in the interior 
and exterior layout. Among the differences, perhaps most important was Braidwood’s 
recommendation concerning the layout of the wards. Unlike older hospital ships, such as 
HMS Victor Emanuel, Braidwood's design called for several patients to "be treated in one 
compartment and watched over by a nurse or nurses who, from living next to this 
compartment or ward, have a constant oversight of its inmates." This was a recommendation 
that may not have been possible while operating under the conversion doctrine as the interior 
layout of passenger cruise liners did not lend themselves to the creation of large, undivided 
wards. Furthermore, many who proposed specialized medical vessels after the turn of the 
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century cited a similar issue while making a case against treating battlefield casualties aboard 
warships. With purpose-built hospital ships, however, the NMS could easily care for large 
numbers of casualties in a single, specially dedicated area.7 
Although Dr. Braidwood suggested substantial differences in the layout of hospital 
ship wards, several of his propositions mirrored those found on earlier ships like Melbourne 
and Mauritius. First, the issues of ventilation and light aboard the ship remained matters of 
chief importance. To promote an ample amount of both, Braidwood recommended 
“continuous skylights arranged along the outside of the walls.” He noted, however, that the 
skylights would “contract the cubic space and make the wards on the deck above of a smaller 
size than they would otherwise be.” To keep light and ventilation from requiring the sacrifice 
of precious space in the wards, Braidwood pointed out that ventilation of the lower decks 
may also be provided for “by means of openings or windows in the vessel’s side which must 
necessarily be closed in bad weather.” Though like Mauritius and Melbourne, Braidwood 
recommended that skylights be placed at various points along the upper deck to allow natural 
light to enter the upper wards. He also states that two ventilation shafts may be added to pull 
fresh air from the top deck into the lower wards that most require it.8 Another feature which 
remains constant between Braidwood's plans and British hospital ships from the mid-
nineteenth century is the cranes, needed to pluck casualties from a smaller transport vessel 
                                                        
7 HMS Victor Emanuel served as a British hospital ship in China from 1873 to 1899. Before being converted to 
a hospital ship, she participated as a ship of the line in the Anglo-Ashanti wars which spanned a majority of the 
nineteenth century. For a first-hand account of Victor Emanuel and her actions as a hospital ship, see “Report of 
the Sanitary Commission on H.M.S Victor Emanuel and her Invalids,” The Lancet 103, no. 2642 (April 18, 
1874): 550-551, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(02)45258-0.  
 
8 Braidwood, “Hospital Ships,” 916. 
Franklin 45 
 
 
and lower them down through the ship and into their designated ward. Although on these 
more modern ships, the lifts would be steam powered.9 
Finally, Braidwood turned his attention to the medical staff required for his proposed 
vessels and suggested that above all else, the comfort of patients should be of paramount 
concern. Regarding comfort, he recognized that “Whilst very great advance has been made 
during recent years, especially since the Crimean campaign and the civil war in America, in 
the treatment of wounds and accidents among our shore population and in the proper 
conveyance of such wounded persons to hospital, very little attention has been given to the 
comfort of patients treated ‘on board ship.’” To serve this purpose, Braidwood recommended 
the presence of “an efficient naval medical service, but also that of an equally efficient naval 
nursing service," comprised of nurses and medical men, educated in their "special work" and 
who "devote their entire energies" to completing it.10 
While Dr. Braidwood's recommendations concerning the layout, design, and crew of 
his hospital ships were undoubtedly essential points of his argument to note, perhaps his most 
significant point was the cost difference between the conversion method and the building of 
hospital ships from the keel up. It is clear from an 1884 edition the Journal of the Hospitals 
Association that Braidwood had made an early attempt to discern the difference in price 
between the two approaches. In the article, simply titled “Hospital Ships,” Braidwood 
outlined his conclusion that constructing purpose-built hospital ships would place less stress 
on the nation’s purse than the present conversion system. In a fiery criticism of Britain’s 
military spending, he asserted that “If a Government is allowed to expend a quarter-of-a-
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million of pounds on the building and equipment of destructive vessels like Agamemnon and 
Ajax, it will not be blamed, but rather commended, for spending £60,000 or £80,000 in the 
construction of a hospital ship.” 
More than a decade later, in January 1897, Dr. Braidwood, still seeking to convince 
naval planners to adopt his design for hospital ships, echoed this sentiment in a short article 
published in The British Medical Journal. In it, he alluded to the fact that cost had been 
presented as the most significant argument against his purpose-built hospital vessels and 
wrote that "if it be justifiable to spend millions on life destroyers, money should not be 
wanting for a naval ambulance association." This time, however, Braidwood took his 
argument one step further. Having surely observed the United States' massive naval 
expansion that took place during the final two decades of the nineteenth century, Braidwood 
remarked: "Surely we are not going to let the United States Government be the first to add 
ambulance ships to its navy.” From this remark, it is clear that some early advocates of 
British hospital ships saw them not only as critical components in the evacuation of 
battlefield casualties, but also realized their potential contribution to Great Britain’s naval, 
and therefore, world power.11 
As ardently as he may have tried, the historical record does not suggest that military 
leaders ever fully adopted Dr. Braidwood's recommendation for purpose-built hospital ships. 
In fact, the conversion of passenger steamships and obsolete troopships continued through 
the opening years of the new century, and on both sides of the Atlantic, well into the 
following decades. The British Medical Journal provided a detailed description of one such 
vessel, the Nubia, in an article published in June 1900. Like the ships which Dr. Braidwood 
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strongly opposed in his writing, Nubia began its life as a passenger liner for P&O Cruises 
before serving as a troopship on the Indian Service. At 6,000 tons, this massive vessel was 
ultimately refitted for service as a hospital ship during the Second Boer War in South Africa. 
As the article suggests, this ship was ideal for conversion based on her “unsurpassed height 
between decks, and natural ventilation by ports, supplemented by steam exhaustion.” Under 
the orders of the Naval Transport Department and the supervision of Commander Holland, 
Nubia's conversion took only ten days. In that time, its ten wards (including a ward and 
cabins for officers) housed hundreds of cots, hammocks, and beds that allowed for a total 
capacity of 478 persons (436 non-commissioned officers and 42 officers).12 As the article 
points out, Nubia’s capacity was “very nearly the accommodation of a general hospital at the 
base,” which held 500 beds. Unfortunately, however, the medical staff aboard Nubia, a 
majority of which were refugees from the Transvaal, quickly realized that the use of 
swinging hammocks in the convalescent ward was a mistake as it was “difficult to send the 
proper kind of cases for hammocks from the numerous hospitals up-country.” As a result, the 
convalescent wards were refitted with fixed cots thus lowering the total number of beds to 
314; still 50 beds more than the wards proposed by Dr. Braidwood just a few years earlier.13 
Evidence from Nubia’s service record also refutes another of Braidwood’s claims, 
namely that converted ships would not be as efficient at treating battlefield casualties when 
compared with his purpose-built vessels. During its service in the Second Boer War, Nubia 
“received wounded direct from the battlefields on several occasions–from Spion Kop, 
Potgieters, Pieters, and from the fighting into Ladysmith.” From January 5 to March 31, 
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approximately 1,500 men passed through the ship. The article states that of these men, only 
“One officer and six or seven men died, chiefly from enteric fever and dysentery contracted 
in the field.” What is perhaps more impressive than this mortality rate, however, is that 
although a considerable number of men were “shattered by the hardships of the campaign,”  
and unable to return to the field, “large numbers of both sick and wounded passed up to the 
front again, having recovered rapidly.”14 
These rapid recoveries were aided in part by Nubia’s cleanliness which “nothing 
could have exceeded” as well as the ship doctor’s masterful manipulation of the ship’s state-
of-the-art x-ray apparatus. The article points out that with the x-ray machine, a technology 
which had only existed for a mere five years, “numerous bullets, pieces of shell, etc, [were] 
detected and removed.” Based on this piece of evidence, it would appear that Britain’s 
converted hospital ships in the early twentieth century had the potential to become 
reasonably proficient at collecting battlefield casualties and providing effective treatment that 
allowed the soldiers to return to the front. In fact, at the same time Nubia underwent its ten-
day conversion, the British Admiralty Board converted four other vessels–Lismore Castle, 
Acova, Orcana, and Dunera– in the shipyards of South Africa.15 
Treatment Onboard Fighting Ships: Ninnis v. Clayton 
The year 1900 was a watershed moment for the development of military hospital 
ships. Following the Hague Convention of 1899, international law protected hospital ships,  
thus providing military and medical thinkers with a rough framework upon which they could 
more accurately mold their theories about these vessels. The intense effort on behalf of these 
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minds yielded many clearly formulated approaches to the practice of converting passenger 
liners into hospital ships and their applications in the theater of war. Beginning in 1900, the 
hospital ships of the First and Second World Wars began to take shape. 
Among the handful of prominent visionaries who took to Britain’s medical journals to 
present their ideas for military hospital ships, perhaps none was more influential than 
Inspector-General Belgrave Ninnis. At the turn of the twentieth century, Dr. Ninnis was an 
elder statesman in the field of naval medicine. Born in London in 1837, Ninnis spent a large 
part of his career as a surgeon in the Royal Navy before retiring in 1897. In the course of his 
lengthy career, he also served as Staff-Surgeon aboard HMS Discovery during Captain Sir 
George Nares’s British Arctic Expedition of 1876.16 In his retirement years, however, Ninnis 
was an outspoken advocate of specially designated hospital ships which would allow for the 
treatment of battlefield casualties somewhere other than aboard a warship. In one of his 
publications on the subject, titled “Floating Hospitals,” Ninnis outlined his beliefs about the 
need for separate hospital ships arguing that “the retention of the sick and wounded on board 
a modern fighting ship in wartime is not only undesirable for the sound and the wounded, the 
sick and the healthy but is likewise insanitary and depressing.” Furthermore, he believed it 
impossible for the onboard surgeon to be able to perform his duty in the cramped 
environment of a fighting ship. Lacking natural light and fresh air, as well as being 
susceptible to enemy fire, Ninnis believed that fighting ships must be supplemented “by one 
or more vessels devoted entirely to the care and treatment of the sick. Ninnis made no 
distinction as to whether or not these ships should be converted or purpose-built. 17 
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He followed his opening remarks by outlining three critical components of his 
proposed vessels: 
In order that the greatest advantages should accrue to the sick and wounded, I consider it 
essential that 1.) These vessels should be floating hospitals, the treatment,  and care of the 
sick and wounded being their sole and only use. 2.)  That the arrangements should be such as 
to embody all the essentials of a small but perfectly  equipped land hospital, suitable for both 
medical and surgical cases, infectious fevers expected. 3.) That the propelling power, whilst 
sufficient to enable the vessel to keep within signaling distance of the fleet to which it should 
be attached, should be so arranged as to leave ample space for the wards.18 
 
Like his eighteenth-century predecessors, Ninnis seems to have been concerned with 
ventilation and separation of the sick aboard his ship. In several instances, he stresses his 
belief that “The wards should be absolutely without communication with one with the other, 
and that each should have direct independent air communication with the upper deck.” In 
addition, his recommendation on the placement of the ship’s engine reflects the opinion of 
Dr. Braidwood who believed that one way to achieve the utmost comfort for patients onboard 
a hospital ship was to place the engines “out of the way, as near as possible to the stern of the 
vessel.”19 
Dr. Ninnis also made several innovative recommendations which ultimately helped 
shape the construction of British hospital ships at the beginning of World War I. First, he 
called for “beds or cots, swinging by short slings, but capable of being fixed by means of iron 
stays, metal stanchions head and foot supporting the whole.” He also insisted that “Operation 
wards should be on the upper deck and immediately adjoining a lift well, which should pass 
directly into the surgical ward. This lift should be of sufficient area to contain a mattress of 
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the same size as those in use in the ward and also by an attendant.” Moreover, in the wake of 
the Great War as the United States began work on its first purpose-built hospital ship, U.S.S. 
Relief (AH-1), it appears that Dr. Ninnis' writings may have influenced American 
shipbuilders. Indeed, a survey of the original architectural plans for Relief (AH-1), reveals 
large elevator shaft–one of four total– positioned immediately beside the entrance to the 
operating rooms which would allow for the convenient movement of casualties from the 
lower deck wards to the upper deck.20 Lastly, Ninnis believed it was “most essential” that 
electricity be used to light the ship. As he noted, “the power required for producing this 
would be utilised for various other purposes, as is done in our larger passenger steamers.”21 
While Belgrave Ninnis advocated for the inclusion of non-combative floating 
hospitals, converted or otherwise, in the fleet of the Royal Navy, some of his contemporaries 
believed that with the proper adjustments naval surgeons could offer sufficient medical 
treatment aboard fighting vessels. Immediately following Dr. Ninnis’ article, five fellow 
surgeons posed questions for the retired Inspector-General. Of these five, two related directly 
to the treatment of casualties aboard warships. First, Surgeon-General Michael O’Dwyer 
expressed that he wished to hear Ninnis address “whether in a modern man-of-war, 
considering the demands of antiseptic surgery it was possible or fair to the wounded to 
attempt to treat [casualties] aboard.” Likewise, Fleet Surgeon G. Kirker pointed out that 
while the goal of hospital ships was to evacuate the wounded after action, "in all probability, 
the numbers would be so great that hospital ships would not be able to receive them all." As a 
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result, "some would have to be treated on board their own ships." Kirker believed that in 
order to accomplish this task, warships needed "some place to carry out this treatment with a 
reasonable chance of success."22 
The historical record indicates that O’Dwyer and Kirker were not the only ones who 
questioned the necessity of specially designated hospital ships in the Royal Navy as outlined 
by Braidwood and Ninnis. After all, were sailors who were injured while fighting the enemy 
aboard a warship to be transferred to a hospital ship instead of receiving prompt treatment by 
medical staff on their own vessel? In an article written for the British Medical Journal, 
Surgeon F.H.A. Clayton expressed his belief that the treatment of casualties could take place 
aboard a fighting ship. He stated simply, “In naval warfare, all arrangements for the succor of 
the wounded must be subject to the condition that they do not in any way impair the 
efficiency of the ship as a fighting machine.” Clayton argued that while treating the wounded 
aboard fighting ships is difficult “due principally to the occupation of nearly all the space 
below the armoured deck by magazines and engine rooms," these difficulties could be 
overcome with a handful of alterations. He also made it clear that the differences in size, 
armament, and construction of British warships make it “impossible to lay down rules 
universally applicable.”23 
Clayton admitted that providing treatment to the sick and wounded aboard a fighting 
ship comes with its own set of limitations. He pointed out that during an engagement, the 
naval surgeon will find himself in a vulnerable situation and “can merely take all possible 
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23 F.H.A. Clayton, “The Disposal of Wounded in Naval Actions,” The British Medical Journal 2, no. 2121 
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measures to avert impending death from hæmorrhage, shock, or other causes, disinfect and 
dress wounds, remove foreign bodies, apply support to fractured limbs, give restoratives or 
morphine, or otherwise add to his patient’s comfort.” Besides, the caregiver must be aware of 
"The dust and concussion produced by the guns of his own ship,” as well as “the possibility 
of the many paralysing accidents to which she is liable.”24 
To combat these dangers, Clayton suggested the addition of a number of dressing 
stations placed throughout the ship. This idea, he noted, was based on a system developed by 
the Japanese Imperial Navy. Conforming to the Japanese model, Dr. Clayton asserted that the 
dressing stations should be located as forward and aft in ship as possible, as opposed to 
concentrated in one area, in hopes of avoiding “the risk of such disaster as that in the Hujei, 
where one shell accounted for all of the medical staff.” Furthermore, he outlined four 
necessary conditions of these warship dressing stations. First, “The removal of patients to 
[dressing stations] should not interfere with the working of guns or supply of ammunition.” 
Second, “They should be protected from enemy fire.” Next, “They should be accessible from 
those parts of the ship where men are most likely to get hurt.” Finally, “They should be cool, 
clean, well-lighted, roomy, and lofty.” 25 
Even if it were possible to create a handful of comfortable dressing stations to treat 
casualties aboard fighting ships, it would not be enough for those men who required more 
than simple dressings. For this, Dr. Clayton recommended the addition of an operating room 
and sick quarters. Conceding that "In a space of 400 feet by 75 by 30, crammed with engines 
and stores of all sorts, and inhabited by 800 men, a perfect operation theater cannot be 
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expected," he suggested that, if possible, surgeons wait to perform their operations until after 
the action has ended. Mirroring the notions of many of his predecessors and contemporaries, 
Clayton argued that these improvised operating theaters should be “large, well ventilated and 
lighted, and not much in use during an engagement, such for instance as the captain’s cabin, 
ward room, and sick bay could be stripped of their fittings and thoroughly cleansed 
Following the completion of operations, the spaces would return to their original use.”26  
Based on these recommendations, one might think that hospital ships, which were 
explicitly designed to handle even the most advanced medical procedures, would be the clear 
choice when compared to Clayton's hastily assembled dressing stations and improvised 
operating rooms. In the closing sentences of the article, Clayton addressed the use of hospital 
ships but provided his readers with an important reminder: “The value of hospital ships to 
accompany fleets in time of war is so universally conceded that it seems unnecessary to do 
more than refer to it. It must, however, be remembered that on foreign stations most ships 
even then would have to rely upon their own resources.”27 
Each of these thinkers–Braidwood, Ninnis, and Clayton– were critical to shaping 
Britain’s ideas about what a military hospital ship should be. After the Great War, their ideas 
migrated across the Atlantic and also played an essential role in the development of 
America's first hospital ships. Although there are variations between each of their visions, 
several common threads still appear. These threads must be understood in order to determine 
whether or not the British and American hospital ships that went into battle during the First 
and Second World Wars performed to the expectations of their visionaries. The first 
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commonality that weaves its way through each figure's writings is the belief that hospital 
ships were necessary to a nation's fleet. Another common feature was that these floating 
treatment facilities (whether they be on specially designated hospital ships or aboard fighting 
ships) should be well-lit, well ventilated, and above all else clean.  
Hospital ships should strive to provide the utmost comfort for patients while also 
attending to as many casualties as possible. Each of these men placed their trust in the 
international laws which were put in place to protect hospital ships. In their minds, the Red 
Cross insignia and the articles of The Hague and Geneva Conventions would provide ample 
protection against any predatory actions on the part of an enemy combatant. The wars of the 
early twentieth century, however, differed vastly from those fought before. On the 
battlefields of the First and Second World Wars, even the floating bastions known as hospital 
ships were not exempt from the wrath of combat. 
 
British Hospital Ships during the First World War: The Gallipoli Campaign, 1915-1916 
Failure of Command 
“The country is broken,” leader of the Allied Mediterranean Expeditionary Force 
(MEF), General Sir Ian Hamilton, wrote from the eastern Mediterranean theater in the fall of 
1915:  
Mountainous, arid, and void of supplies; the water found in the areas occupied by our 
 forces is quite inadequate for their needs: the only practicable beaches are small, 
 cramped breaks in impracticable lines of cliffs; with the wind in certain quarters no 
 sort of landing is possible; the wastage, by bombardment and wreckage, of lighters 
 and small craft, has led to crisis after crisis in our carrying capacity, whilst over 
 every single beach plays fitfully throughout each day a devastating shell fire at 
 medium ranges. 28 
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This passage, from a dispatch outlining the difficulties that the British medical services 
(including the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand) faced at Gallipoli, illustrates the 
hell that Allied forces had to endure throughout the campaign. In another way, it 
unknowingly outlines some of the factors, namely inadequate preparation and harsh 
environmental conditions, which forced Britain’s hospital ships to play a vital role in the 
eastern theater.  This short description sets the stage for analyzing their performance during 
World War I. 
When assessing the performance of British hospital ships during the First World War, 
it may seem insufficient to focus one’s entire attention on a single campaign which took 
place relatively early in the conflict. However, the Gallipoli campaign, which lasted for more 
than ten months between February 1915 and January of 1916, offers a useful window 
through which to gain an understanding of the roles and performance of Britain’s hospital 
ships during the Great War. For one thing, in contrast with the Western Front in Europe, 
where most hospital ships were tasked with ferrying casualties the short distance across the 
English Channel, the Middle Eastern theater required a much longer and often more arduous 
evacuation route. British evacuees from the Dardanelles, who were expected to recover 
within a matter of weeks, faced a challenging four-hour journey to the Allied base hospital on 
the Greek island of Lemnos. Those with more severe injuries were forced to endure an 
agonizing three and a half day trip to the Egyptian port city of Alexandria, or six days to 
Malta. Casualties bound for England would have to remain aboard the hospital ship for more 
than a week.29 Furthermore, notoriously poor pre-campaign planning on the part of MEF and 
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embarrassingly inaccurate casualty projections meant that Allied medical services were 
woefully unprepared to treat the massive number of casualties that fell from Turkish bullets 
as well as those who succumbed to sickness and disease in the network of unsanitary and 
insect-ridden trenches.   
Additionally, the physical environment of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli Peninsula 
required more significant numbers of ocean-going treatment facilities. Considering the role 
of the environment, both at Gallipoli and in the upcoming discussion of the Pacific theater 
during the Second World War will allow for a greater understanding of the importance of 
Anglo-American hospital ships in early twentieth-century combat.30 With a jagged coastline 
characterized by small, rocky beaches and eclipsed by soaring cliff faces, Britain’s medical 
services found it nearly impossible to establish viable treatment facilities on the land. 
Therefore, the only alternative was to implement an evacuation system which allowed 
casualties to be removed from the beachheads aboard small; flat bottom boats known as 
“lighters,” and transported to the hospital ships that sat anchored off the coast. While the 
journey from the beach to the hospital ships was short, it was often extremely perilous. 
During the winter months, the rough waters of the Aegean Sea made it difficult to transport 
the wounded. Compounded with these environmental hazards, Turkish artillery and small 
arms fire often rained down on the small vessels as they fought against the swells to make 
their way to the ships. Even the hospital ships themselves were not immune from the 
occasional artillery shell.   
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Based on the fact that fighting in the Dardanelles necessitated such a large force of 
hospital ships to supplement the difficulties of the land-based medical services, the Gallipoli 
Campaign of 1915-1916 represents the “high water mark” in the use of Britain’s hospital 
ships during World War I. In the many decades since 1916, historians have produced a rather 
robust body of literature addressing the performance of Allied forces at Gallipoli. Therefore, 
the goal here is not to “refight” the campaign. The Gallipoli campaign represents the greatest 
test of British hospital ships during the First World War. During the fighting, these vessels 
did more than live up to the expectations of their early theorizers, like Ninnis and Braidwood. 
By the time the grossly mismanaged battle ended with an Allied evacuation in 1916, the 
hospital ships were the only component of Britain’s entire medical service that made a 
positive impact on the conflict.31 
In 1914, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, devised the Gallipoli 
campaign as an attempt to break the deadlock on the Western Front. The plan called upon the 
Royal Navy’s fleet of warships to steam up the Dardanelle Straits, which connect the Aegean 
Sea with the Sea of Marmara, and capture Constantinople. This would, in turn, open the 
Eastern Front to Allied troops and relieve pressure on Russia while also strangling the supply 
line that ran to the Central Powers. Moreover, many in the Admiralty hoped that successful 
execution of the plan would crush the will of the Ottomans to continue fighting on the side of 
the Central Powers. While this plan was undoubtedly ambitious and had the potential to 
drastically alter the course of the war’s final years, as historian Christine Hallett points out, 
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Books, 2014); and Philip Haythornthwaite, Gallipoli 1915: Frontal Assault on Turkey (Oxford, UK: Osprey 
Publishing, 1991).  
Franklin 59 
 
 
the campaign in the Dardanelles turned out to be just one more of the Allies’ “costly, 
destructive–and ultimately worthless” attempts at achieving a breakthrough in the east. After 
the initial naval attack failed to break the Turkish defenses, the Allies conducted a series of 
amphibious landings in April and then again in August of 1915, hoping to defeat the Ottoman 
forces on the ground (Figure 2.1). Following a complete failure of command by General Sir 
Ian Hamilton, which ultimately resulted in his removal, Allied troops evacuated the peninsula 
during the winter of 1916. Throughout the ten months of fighting, British forces, as well as 
those of her dominions in Australia and New Zealand, sustained approximately 250,000 
casualties. 32  
In recent histories of the 
campaign, the primary point of criticism 
has been the pre-campaign planning that 
took place at Allied headquarters on 
Lemnos. Of the many blunders 
committed by the MEF, the failure to 
create an accurate casualty projection, 
and therefore failure to provide 
adequate resources for medical 
treatment was perhaps the most 
egregious. In his writings on the 
Gallipoli campaign, Mark Harrison, 
a historian of Britain’s combat 
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Figure 2.1 Map of Gallipoli and Dardanelles, showing landing 
options for the 1915 Campaign as well as the main landings and 
feints made on April 25, 1915. Source: Peter Doyle and Matthew 
R. Bennett, “Military Geography: The Influence of Terrain in the 
Outcome of the Gallipoli Campaign, 1915,” The Geographical 
Journal 165, no. 1 (March 1999): 15. 
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medicine during the First World War, remarked that “On the Western Front the medical 
services reached a level of efficiency and sophistication unprecedented in British military 
history, but in other theaters of the war their performance was, to say the least, mixed." The 
other theaters to which Harrison refers are Salonika, East Africa, and Gallipoli. He argues 
that the performance of the medical staff in   these areas “produced medical catastrophes 
reminiscent of those in South Africa and the Crimea.” In preparation for the Gallipoli 
campaign, Hamilton and his officers worked to create casualty projections for the attack. 
Simply defined, casualty projections are attempts by military planners to project how many 
casualties (killed and wounded) their forces will sustain during a given military action. They 
consider many factors including geography as well as the offensive and defensive capabilities 
of the enemy. In the case of the Gallipoli campaign, a number of drastically underestimated 
projections appeared before the battle. This, in turn, meant that Allied forces did not see the 
need to have large numbers of hospital ships or other medical treatment facilities readily 
available for the fighting. It was only after the conflict escalated that General Sir Ian 
Hamilton recognized the need for an increased number of hospital ships.33 
The failure of command that occurred concerning medical arrangements for Gallipoli 
resulted in part from illness as well as from infighting and personal politics between the 
leaders of the MEF. During the planning phase of the first amphibious landing, the senior 
ranking Medical Officer (MO) was Commander of Britain’s Defence Medical Services’ 
(DMS) Surgeon-General W.G. Birrell. Upon arrival in the Mediterranean, Birrell became 
sick and was forced to remain on base in Egypt while Hamilton and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Alfred Keble, Birrell’s assistant, continued to Allied headquarters on the island of Lemnos. 
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Acting in Birrell’s stead, the comparatively inexperienced Keble was responsible for 
producing accurate casualty projections for the planned assault. Keble's lack of experience 
worried his superiors, and upon arrival at Lemnos, he was not provided with adequate 
information to execute his duty. In fact, according to his statement before the Dardanelles 
Commission, he did not have a lighter to go between ships, nor was he able to go ashore.34 
 Furthermore, while he made numerous attempts to contact General Hamilton 
regarding the offensive, the commander never responded. After more than a week in what 
amounted to solitary confinement aboard his ship, a staff officer informed Keble that HQ had 
completed the casualty projections without him, and had already made what they believed 
were appropriate medical arrangements. In total, Hamilton and his staff projected that the 
amphibious assault on the unforgiving beaches of Gallipoli would result in a combined loss 
of 3000 soldiers both for Britain and the forces of the Australian and New Zealand Army 
Corps (ANZAC). In order to treat these men, they made arrangements for three hospital ships 
to anchor off the coast. At the time, they could not have possibly recognized the gravity of 
their miscalculations. By nightfall on April 25, the opening day of the assault, the 29th 
Division of the British Army alone experienced a loss of more than 3,000 casualties.35 
 Faced with mounting casualties, HQ hastily revised their arrangements to include a 
number of troop transports, or “black ships,” to arrive in the eastern Mediterranean and assist 
in evacuation efforts. However, as the official history of Britain’s medical services at 
Gallipoli notes, these transports were only equipped to handle 7,500 “lightly wounded” 
casualties. Moreover, first-hand accounts given to the Dardanelles Commission after the 
                                                        
34 Harrison, The Medical War, 176. 
 
35 Harrison, The Medical War, 174-175. 
Franklin 62 
 
 
campaign reveal that these troop transports were vastly different than designated hospital 
ships. According to Colonel C.M. Begg’s statement, regarding the transport ship Seang 
Choon, the vessel was “totally unsuitable for carrying seriously-wounded cases. She was a 
very old ship and should have had a thorough overhaul even before she could be made 
suitable for the accommodation of lightly wounded. The ship’s hospital had 31 beds, but 
most of the wounded were put ‘tween decks…chiefly on and under tables…With 700 cases 
aboard, the ship was grossly over crowded; there was no operating room available, and the 
staff of 20 orderlies was utterly inadequate. It is clear from his statement that Col. Begg 
would have preferred to be placed on a hospital ship which was better suited for its task of 
treating casualties. Also, wounded soldiers tended not to feel safe aboard the "black ships." 
As historian Mark Harrison notes, "Once on board the transports, the wounded feared that 
they would be liable to attack from submarines, since the hastily improvised vessels were 
neither painted nor registered as hospital ships.” 36 
The problem of safety and overcrowding, however, was not exclusive to the 
makeshift medical transports. A number of accounts from soldiers, and more often nurses, 
reveal that hospital ships themselves experienced high levels of overcrowding which 
ultimately impacted their ability to provide useful medical treatment. In Signaler Ellis Silas’ 
post-war memoir, he recalled his experience aboard the British hospital ship Galeka: “This is 
not a proper hospital ship, there is only accommodation for 150 wounded – we have on board 
some 500 or 600, many very terrible cases and the filth is awful.” Likewise, on August 9, one 
of Britain’s hospital ships, HMHS Assaye, took on more than 800 wounded men for 
evacuation from Cape Helles, even though there were only six nurses on board. One of the 
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nurses, Eveline Vickers-Foote, recalled the difficulty of receiving casualties while under 
constant fire from Turkish artillery and stated that “I do really think the Turks could have hit 
us if they liked, but it seemed as if they wanted us to behave as a Hospital Ship.”37  
While reports like that of Vickers-Foote seem to indicate that the Ottomans did not 
respect the Red Cross markings of hospital ships, nor did they operate under the guidelines of 
international laws like the Geneva Conventions, other first-hand Allied accounts paint an 
entirely different picture of their Middle Eastern foes. In a letter home, soldier Basil Brooke 
explained that “The old Turk is a great gentleman. He never shoots at the hospital ships in the 
bay, or at the hospitals, very different from our friend the Bosch.”38 
 In that same vein, historian Emory Massman explains that “One reason the 
Dardanelles operation went off so smoothly, as far as evacuating wounded to hospital ships 
was concerned, was because the Turks were remarkably clean fighters who never disregarded 
the Geneva Convention or hampered removal of the injured.” Here the historical record 
presents a bit of a dilemma. Did Turkish forces fire on hospital ships even though it was a 
violation of international law? The evidence suggests that German submarines often fired on 
hospital ships indiscriminately, a subject which will be discussed briefly at the end of this 
chapter, but conflicting reports involving the Turks are certainly less clear. To help clarify, it 
is necessary to sift through more first-hand accounts to determine the truth. Some of the most 
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useful eyewitness accounts from aboard hospital ships in the Gallipoli Bay come from the 
nurses who treated the sick and wounded received from the peninsula.39 
 The nurses of Great Britain, and her Dominions, that served aboard hospital ships at 
Gallipoli were fundamental to the eventual success of evacuations relative to the initial gross 
mismanagement regarding Allied medical arrangements. As Christine Hallett posited, 
“Nurses on board hospital ships in Gallipoli Bay probably came closer to fighting than any 
other female participants in the First World War.”40 This assertion is illustrated by the 
account of Sister Daisy Richmond who was nearly killed by a Turkish bullet on August 11. 
While receiving casualties from the peninsula, Richmond was “speaking to one boy,” and 
“moved away to another patient when a bullet hit him and lodged in his thigh.” As she 
recalled, “it just missed.”41 
 On the opening day of the battle, another Allied nurse wrote in her diary that it was 
“red letter day” as they sat at anchor off the coast of Gaba Tepe. At the same time, the nurse 
wrote that artillery shells were “bursting all around.”42 And in one particularly revealing 
entry from August 1915, Sister M.E. Webster, working aboard the British hospital ship 
Gloucester Castle, recounted the beauty of the peninsula during the day, with deeply blue 
gullies and the sea and sky which “glow with wonderful tints.” At nighttime, however, this 
peaceful scene would change. As she described it: “as darkness falls, lights spring out up and 
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down the hill-side like busy fireflies. The insistent tapping of machine guns destroys the 
silence of the night and the sharp reports of the snipers…sometimes we find stray bullets 
embedded in the wood-work on board.” When one considers that the Geneva Convention 
required hospital ships to run fully illuminated at night, it becomes clear how this bright 
white vessel, without arms with which to defend itself, could become an inviting target for 
Ottoman marksmen. Indeed, nursing aboard a hospital ship during the heat of combat was a 
dangerous profession.43  
 For these nurses though, the fear of enemy fire was rivaled only by the horrors of war 
that they experienced below deck while treating the wounded. On April 25, 1915, following 
fierce fighting between the Ottoman forces of General Mustafa Kemal and Allied ANZAC 
soldiers, Sister Ella Tucker remembered how “The wounded from the landing commenced to 
come on board at 9 am and poured into the ship's wards from barges and boats. The majority 
still had on their field dressing, and a number of these were soaked through. Two orderlies 
cut off the patient's clothes and I started immediately with dressings. There were 76 patients 
in my ward, and I did not finish until 2 am.” In a subsequent entry from May, Sister Tucker’s 
words serve as a gruesome depiction of the nurse’s work: “Every night there are two or three 
deaths, sometimes five or six; it’s just awful flying from one ward into another … each night 
is a nightmare, the patients’ faces all look so pale with the flickering ship’s lights.”44 
Likewise, Sister Lydia King explained that she would “Never forget the awful feeling of 
hopelessness” that she often felt while performing her duty. Solely responsible for the care of 
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more than 250 patients aboard the hospital ship Sicilia, many of whom had wounds too awful 
for her to describe, Sister King commented that “One loses sight of all the honour and glory 
[of battle] in the work that we are doing.”45 
 Soldiers also recorded their enemy’s approach to combat. In another account, which 
refutes the characterization of the Ottomans as clean fighters, Signaler Ellis Silas of the MEF 
recounts his journey from the beaches of Gallipoli to the relative safety of the hospital ship 
S.S. Galeka. Once he reached the on-shore casualty clearing station, which he describes as “a 
scene of well-ordered confusion,” where scores of wounded littered the narrow beach and 
waited for transport to a hospital ship, assuming they were not gunned down before they 
disembarked. As he pointed out, these evacuation operations could not be carried out “until 
well after sundown, for the enemy is sending a continuous rain of shells in this direction." 
During the difficult and time-consuming process, Silas recalled how many soldiers were 
"gasping out their lives before they [could be] transferred to the boats." Once cleared from 
the chaotic beach, the wounded were loaded onto the lighters and began their journey toward 
the distant hospital ships. Silas remembered how he and the rest of the wounded were "towed 
from ship to ship; always receiving the same reply, ‘Full up.'" Upon finding a ship with 
available space, the men, still in their lighter, were lifted aboard the ship using derricks which 
were originally designed to lower a passenger liner's lifeboats into the water in the event of 
an emergency. In this case, the process was simply reversed. In his account, Silas expressed 
his thankfulness for the calm weather and smooth seas citing the account of a fellow soldier 
who mentioned that "during the choppy seas of the last few days the wounded suffered 
terribly when being put aboard the hospital ship." Environmental forces were ever present 
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during the battle and often impacted military action. Silas concluded his entry: "Even right 
out here an occasional shell comes buzzing through the air and drops close alongside - it 
would really be rough luck to get hit so far away from the firing line after having been in 
such thick scrimmages." 46   
 Once aboard the hospital ships, however, some soldiers did not find the solace they so 
desperately sought. In a diary entry from April 28, a young midshipman named Robert 
Dickinson recounted the scene aboard one of Britain's hospital ships. "Her decks are a 
perfectly awful sight--hundreds of dying and wounded men lying about quite unattended. 
The very limited medical staff are quite unable to cope.”47 In another instance, Sergeant 
Charles Nicol wrote from another hospital ship that he had “stopped one,” meaning he had 
caught a piece of flying shrapnel. In his case, it was more than just a piece, “One piece 
shattered my right wrist, another made a big flesh wound in my right shoulder, and another 
grazed my left shoulder,” he wrote. Nicol also recounted how he was then taken to a hospital 
ship where they amputated his right hand and put 13 stitches into his right shoulder causing 
him to feel like “a bit of a wreck.” However, Nicol did try to make light of his injuries when 
he wrote: "I think that the gentle enemy might have been content to smash my left hand, and 
thus save me the tedious job of learning to write with it.” 48 In another account, a sergeant 
attached to the medical services and serving aboard a hospital ship recalled that after the first 
night of fighting, casualties began coming aboard around midnight. To his recollection, some 
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of the soldiers “had their legs off, other lads no arms or hands, some were without fingers or 
toes. A lot of poor fellows had terrible head wounds. Some had their ears blown off, and 
others their eyes shot out. Nearly all had to be operated on, and this was done by lamp 
light.”49 
 For other soldiers, hospital ships did seem to represent the bastion of safety and 
comfort that their original advocates intended them to be. On May 3, 1915, one Gallipoli 
veteran wrote to his family that he had “been wounded in the right shoulder,” but was 
“progressing finely.” According to his letter, which he penned while convalescing aboard an 
unnamed hospital ship, he and his comrades were “very comfortable here indeed. Nice soft 
beds and attendants that spoil you.”50 Likewise, Royal Marine Harry Askin wrote of a 
pleasant experience he had aboard the hospital ship Gascon after being evacuated from 
Gallipoli: “I had my wound properly dressed and cleaned and then passed out. I hadn't even 
time to realize that I was on a soft, clean spring bed and that a real Englishwoman, young and 
nice, had dressed my wound. I went right away and must have slept at least twenty hours.” 
Indeed, for some men, Britain’s Great War hospital ships at Gallipoli met the intentions of 
early theorizers, like Braidwood and Ninnis, who believed that providing comfort, above all 
else, should be the vessel’s paramount goal.51  
These accounts reveal that some soldiers experienced their time aboard hospital ships 
in the eastern Mediterranean in vastly different ways. While some men commented on the 
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inefficient and ill-supplied medical staff and others recoiled at the filth and extreme suffering 
they witnessed, others appreciated the simple comfort of a soft bed and a friendly face. In the 
end, the conditions aboard the hospital ships, no matter how horrid, were nothing compared 
to the environment that soldiers had to endure while on the peninsula. Harsh climate, 
unforgiving geography, and hordes of insects made life on “Cape Hell,” a term which many 
soldiers used to refer to Cape Helles, feel much too close to the fire and brimstone of the real 
thing.52 
 
Hospital Ships and the Environment of the Gallipoli Peninsula 
 The environment was one of the primary reasons that hospital ships played such an 
active role in removing casualties from the Gallipoli Peninsula. Unable to establish viable 
field hospitals on the coastline’s narrow beaches, which often fell under Turkish fire, hospital 
ships were the only option for handling the massive volume of sick and wounded soldiers 
who needed evacuation, unlike the Western Front where field hospitals and ambulance trains 
allowed for a handful of alternative removal methods. Moreover, as seasons changed and the 
unforgiving temperatures of the winter months transitioned into unrelenting heat during the 
summer months, soldiers came aboard hospital ships suffering from exposure and other 
climate-related illnesses. Coupled with the often harsh climate and lack of fresh water and 
food supplies, as well as abysmal sanitation on the part of British and ANZAC forces, meant 
that the spread of disease was rampant.53 Neither were these diseases limited to just the 
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fighting men. Some accounts reveal that once hospital ships took aboard men suffering from 
various maladies, the ailment spread to the nurses and orderlies, as well as to other soldiers 
who suffered only from superficial wounds. Considering the environmental components at 
play during the Gallipoli campaign will help provide a richer context in which to view 
Britain’s Great War hospital ships.  
 The physical environment of the Gallipoli peninsula was vastly different from 
anything that Allied soldiers may have experienced on the Western Front or in other theaters 
of the war. The climate and vegetation on Gallipoli are typically Mediterranean. During the 
winter months, mean air temperatures fall between 44 and 48ºF. The hot summers, however, 
are characterized by air temperatures often exceeding 80ºF. While these temperatures may 
seem manageable, when coupled with strong winds in the winter and severe drought during 
the summer, they present a potential disaster to anyone who is unprepared for exposure to 
them. The vegetation in the area consists mostly of "low, dense, herbaceous and aromatic 
shrubs of garrigue type.”54 
 The landscape of the Gallipoli peninsula is characterized by a series of elevations 
which Allied soldiers often had to scale while advancing on the Turkish forces. Some 
densely vegetated slopes feature extremely pronounced gullies and deep ravines as a result of 
seasonal rivers formed by heavy rain. Most of the peninsula's rivers are seasonal leaving 
many of the area’s valleys dry for much of the year. This also meant that fresh water was 
challenging for Allied troops to acquire. As a result, men often suffered from dehydration 
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which could become extremely dangerous when combined with common battlefield diseases 
like diarrhea and dysentery. In many cases, the combination proved fatal.55 
 From the opening actions of the campaign to its bitter end in the winter of 1916, the 
environment played a critical role. Even the initial series of Allied landings, which were 
scheduled to take place on April 23, 1915, had to be delayed for two days owing to poor 
weather conditions and rough seas. At the same time, the failure of leadership compounded 
these harsh environmental factors. General Hamilton and his staff, who had so irresponsibly 
mismanaged the pre-campaign medical arrangements, also failed to procure adequate 
preparatory reconnaissance concerning the physical layout of the peninsula. In fact, the 
leaders of the MEF gathered much of their information concerning geography and terrain 
from tourist guidebooks that they had purchased at shops in Alexandria.56 As a result, they 
possessed minimal knowledge, if any, regarding geography, terrain, and fresh water supplies, 
and failed to achieve, much less exploit, any tactical advantages during the campaign (Fig 2). 
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 To make matters worse, 
the various landing points 
selected by the MEF leaders 
were perhaps the most 
geographically 
disadvantageous points from 
which to begin an amphibious 
assault. While Suvla Bay, on 
the northern point of the 
peninsula, would have been the 
best choice for a landing due to 
its wide beaches and locally 
available supply of fresh water, 
MEF headquarters rejected the 
location as it was too far away 
from their objective on the Kilid 
Bahr Plateau. Instead, they 
chose landing positions on the south-west point of the peninsula where the steep inclines rose 
almost immediately out of the sea. The most prominent of these perilous heights, Achi Baba, 
was the stronghold of the Ottoman defenses and quickly became the focal point of General 
Figure 2.2 Topography of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Source: Peter 
Doyle and Matthew R. Bennett, “Military Geography: The Influence 
of Terrain in the Outcome of the Gallipoli Campaign, 1915,” The 
Geographical Journal 165, no. 1 (March 1999): 20. 
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Hamilton’s attack. Facing the impregnable Turkish defenses, Allied soldiers unsuccessfully 
attacked four times before abandoning their goal.57 
 References to the hellacious environment on the peninsula, as well as the repulsive 
conditions of the Allied trench network, appear time and again in the letters and memoirs of 
the soldiers who were there. In an October 1915 letter to a business associate, Captain Harold 
Cronin described the landscape of the Dardanelles: “The country is really quite pretty and 
just like the hills and valleys of South Wales, but there are no brooks or rivers. It rains hard 
for a month each year usually about this time and then there is no more until the next rainy 
season." He went on to explain that these looks were deceptive and that the country was not 
as healthy as it may have appeared. "There are millions and millions of flies here," he wrote, 
"and they are all over everything. Put a cup of tea down without a cover, and it is 
immediately covered with dead ones, they are all around your mouth and directly you open it 
to speak or to eat in they pop." Cronin also described the trenches which were “narrow and 
smelly and one is being potted at and shelled all the time.” His letter also reveals a bit of 
information about hospital ships. As he explains, “All the hospital work is done on board a 
ship that stands in the bay. If the cases are serious or lengthy, they are transferred to one of 
the hospital ships that calls daily and then go to either one of the bases or back to England.”58 
 Other accounts too referred to the wretched environment in which the soldiers were 
forced to live. Sergeant Major George Shipley of the 10th Middlesex Regiment noted that he 
and his men were “all parched with the heat and no water” due to poor planning on the part 
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of MEF leaders.59 For 31 year old Thomas H. Watts, life in the depressing trenches where 
“the dirt will persist in falling on your face when you are trying to sleep and when it rains 
you’re up to your knees in no time,” had him pining for “a rub at a bed and roof, also a drop 
of beer perchance.”60 Watts also expressed his feelings that Mother Nature herself had 
trapped the Allied soldiers on the island leaving them no way out: “We have the sea on three 
sides and the Turks on the fourth, so we truly are between the devil and the deep sea.” For 
these men, environmental conditions on the island often represented another enemy with 
whom they were constantly at war.  
At the same time, the land-based medical services were at the mercy of the natural 
world and had to adapt their work to meet those restrictions. In a letter on December 4, 1916, 
Sgt. A.L.G. Whyte recalled how providing medical care on the narrow beaches was a task to 
“make angels weep.” Furthermore, while working in a stationary hospital "pitched right on 
the sand of the sea-shore," with total casualties often doubling its capacity, Whyte noted that 
the intense southwest winds on the peninsula meant that the medical tents were often subject 
to collapsing on top of their inhabitants.61 
 On the hospital ships, nurses also recorded their patients who suffered from exposure 
to the brutal environment. Commenting on one batch of casualties that she received while 
working onboard the British hospital ship Braemar Castle, Sister Jentie Paterson noted that 
she had taken on several patients who were filthy with mud and lice as well as “frostbites, 
awful ones.” The impact of intensely cold winter weather meant that some soldiers would 
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lose their hands or feet to frostbite. Frostbite, however, was only one of many maladies that 
Sister Paterson encountered. In the one group alone, there was “one Captain with Enteric 
[typhoid] bad. 3 bad malarial fevers, 2 bad feet frost bitten. 1 gunshot thigh. 1 nerves, 
complete wreck.”62 
 As Paterson’s account illustrates, in addition to frostbite and enemy bullets, disease 
presented another major concern to the Allied forces. Illnesses like dysentery and diarrhea 
decimated the population of fighting men. Throughout the campaign, approximately 110,000, 
or one third of the entire MEF, contracted disease and had to be evacuated from the 
peninsula. Of these, nearly 40,000 suffered from dysentery or diarrhea--referred to among the 
soldiers as “The Gallipoli Gallop.” During the warmer months, these diseases spread among 
the Allied forces like wildfire. In September 1915 alone, approximately 800 cases of 
dysentery were evacuated from the peninsula every day.63 There were two factors which 
primarily contributed to the rapid spread of enteric infections from which most soldiers 
suffered: the lack of fresh water and the abundance of insects. 
  Without fresh water, soldiers often became dehydrated and were unable to clean their 
living spaces, their clothes, or themselves– leading to infections from lice. In an October 
1915 letter to his mother, Capt. W. Brown explained that “All the water we got came from 
ships, and is pumped from tank lighters into canvas troughs, about a mile along the beach 
from us.” With a ration of only three pints per day, Brown lamented: “I never felt so 
uncomfortable in my life…The sensation of thirst is almost painful.”64 
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 Flies, as a result of partially or entirely unburied corpses, were also significant 
carriers of disease. In a memo that ultimately made its way to members of the British 
Parliament, Brigadier-General Sir A.H. Murdoch described the awful scene. “The flies are 
spreading dysentery at an alarming rate…We must be evacuating 1000 sick and wounded 
men every day,” he wrote. “When the autumn rains come and unbury our dead, now lying 
under a light soil in our trenches, sickness must increase. Even now the stench in many of our 
trenches is sickening." As the only means of evacuation from the peninsula, hospital ships, 
their medical staff, and casualties already on board were continuously exposed to the threat 
of disease as new patients came aboard.65 
  Sister Charlotte La Gallais illustrated the extent to which Allied nurses found 
themselves exposed to disease. As she explained in her diary, hospital ships received 
casualties with the "mud, flies, and creepers" still clinging to their unwashed bodies and 
uniforms. Attempting to stop the spread of disease throughout the ship, nurses would bathe, 
feed, and hydrate the soldiers to the best of their abilities. For months La Gallais repeated the 
pattern of receiving, bathing, feeding, and hydrating the soldiers. Eventually, however, one of 
the microscopic enemies found its way on to her. After days of feeling ill, La Gallais 
discovered that she was suffering from “fleas and crawlers,” causing her to scratch at her skin 
until it was “nearly raw.”66 
 Regardless of the perils that they faced, the effort of nurses working on British 
hospital ships during the Gallipoli campaign saved the lives of countless sick and wounded. 
According to medical historian Christine Hallett, “It is highly likely that the work undertaken 
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by the earliest nurses onboard hospital ships improved patients’ chances of survival.” For 
providing expert assistance to surgeons and offering basic nursing care to the wounded, these 
women, and the duties they performed, should be viewed with the same respect as the 
soldiers who assaulted the beaches of Cape Helles and engaged the Turks on the slopes of 
Achi Baba.67  
  The medical services at Gallipoli shows that hospital ships and their staffs were 
important to the outcome of the campaign. During the action in the Dardanelles, HMHS 
Rewa alone evacuated and treated more than 20,000 soldiers; carrying them back to England 
or distributing them at base hospitals in the Mediterranean. Likewise, on August 9, 1915, 
HMHS Soudan received nearly 1,500 patients from the peninsula. Hospital ships allowed the 
medical services to provide some semblance of effective treatment to casualties, in the face 
of extremely harsh environmental factors and gross mismanagement on the part of military 
leaders. Without their presence in combat operations, the military loss at Gallipoli may have 
turned into an all-out catastrophe for the British war effort. 68 
  In all, 34 British hospital ships came to the rescue of Allied forces during the 
Gallipoli campaign, and in the vision of some of their earliest supporters, many of these 
vessels were converted passenger liners. The largest, and perhaps most notable of these 
conversions was HMHS Britannic. At 47,000 tons, with room for 4000 patients, she was an 
exact duplicate of her fellow White Star Liner, the ill-fated steamer RMS Titanic. As the 
evidence suggests, nurses on board the ships also sought to make their patients as 
comfortable as possible while providing lifesaving medical care aboard specially designated 
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vessels. In terms of meeting the expectations outlined by their earliest advocates, the hospital 
ships at Gallipoli surpassed the expectations of Ninnis and Braidwood. Without the floating 
bastions in the bay, thousands more Allied bodies would still lie interred on the beaches and 
in the trenches beneath the towering heights of Gallipoli. 
 
A False Security: German Attacks on British Hospital Ships during World War I 
 
As actions at Gallipoli demonstrated, British hospital ships served invaluable roles in 
the combat theaters of the First World War while never firing a shot. This did not mean, 
however, that hospital ships never found themselves on the receiving end of enemy 
weaponry. As a number of accounts in the previous section show, Turkish forces did, in fact, 
fire on Britain’s medical vessels while they collected casualties off the coast of Gallipoli. 
These attacks, in part, foreshadowed one of the main defects of early twentieth century 
hospital ships which ultimately played a role in their declining use in combat following the 
Second World War—namely, the ink and paper armor afforded to hospital ships under 
international law. Laws. Such as the Geneva Conventions were not strong enough to protect 
hospital vessels against unscrupulous enemy combatants. While the Ottoman actions at 
Gallipoli clearly illustrate this point, so too do the German submarines which preyed upon 
British hospital ships throughout much of the war 
 This work began by recounting the German attack on HMHS Llandovery Castle in 
June 1918. Unfortunately, the war crimes committed by Captain Helmut Brümmer-Patzig 
and his crew were not isolated incidents. In fact, on a return trip from England to Gallipoli, 
the aforementioned Britannic struck an enemy mine and sank to the bottom of the Aegean. 
Fortunately, there were no patients on board at the time and though 28 died, 1,100 passengers 
survived. As the war continued, so too did enemy violence against clearly marked hospital 
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ships. Eventually, the British decided to remove the distinctive Red Cross markings that 
emblazoned the hull of their hospital ships. Instead, they painted them ordinary combat 
colors and placed them inside their trans-Atlantic convoys. This decision drastically cut 
down on the German’s predatory behavior, but not before a number of British hospital ships, 
their patients, and their crews met their fate at the hands of German torpedoes.69  
 During the course of the war, German submarines torpedoed eight clearly marked 
British hospital ships. In addition, four more vessels sustained considerable physical damage 
and loss of life when they struck German mines. Among these numerous cases, HMS 
Llandovery Castle was certainly the most egregious and represented the largest loss of life 
aboard a hospital ship during the Great War. Apart from this instance, there are two other U-
boat attacks that stand out as particularly costly–the torpedoing of HMHS Lanfranc and 
HMHS Glenart Castle.70 
 The German attack on the Lanfranc occurred on the evening of April 17, 1917 at 
around 8 p.m., while the ship worked to bring home wounded British veterans from the 
Western Front. As she approached the southern coast of England, a torpedo ripped through 
the vessel’s port side. Unlike the sinking of the Llandovery Castle, where the submarine had 
surfaced prior to attacking, survivors of the Lanfranc recalled that their first intimation of the 
attack came from the sudden violence of the explosion.71 Unique from other hospital ships 
attacked by German submarines, however, the Lanfranc was carrying between 160 and 170 
wounded German prisoners whom the British had captured while conducting operations on 
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the Western Front. The U-boat attack on the Lanfranc claimed the lives of 34 individuals–19 
British and 15 Germans. In addition, 152 German prisoners were plucked from the water by 
British patrol vessels that came to the rescue after Lanfranc sank. In The Times, journalists 
rebuked this “culmination of savagery” on the part of the German. In their eyes, attacking 
clearly marked hospital ships and claiming the lives of soldiers and women, as well as 
German prisoners, had “no justification in any conceivable distortion of international law, 
nor in the most brutal creed of necessity.”72 
 In the year following the attack of the Lanfranc, Germany continued its policy of 
unrestricted submarine warfare in earnest and on February 26, 1918, the German U-boat UC-
56 fired a torpedo into the hull of Great Britain’s hospital ship Glenart Castle. According to a 
nearby fisherman who witnessed the attack, the vessel took only eight minutes to disappear 
beneath the choppy surface of the sea. In that time, only seven lifeboats made it into the 
water with 32 survivors. In all 162 staff, nurses, and crew members lost their lives. Among 
the dead was a nurse named Kate Beaufoy who was a veteran of both the Second Boer War 
and the Gallipoli Campaign. In his sermon the following day, Bishop of London Arthur 
Winnington-Ingram lamented to his congregation, “We know now from what happened 
yesterday that there is no repentance for the most awful crimes of violence which have again 
been enacted…The cries of the drowning nurses will echo in our ears forever and will brand 
us as a nation of cowards if we ever cease to strive that such appalling wickedness may be 
impossible forever.”73 
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 In its brutality, the sinking of Glenart Castle closely mirrored the ensuing torpedoing 
of Llandovery Castle in June 1918. In the weeks that followed the Glenart Castle attack, 
ships in the Channel came across the lifeless bodies of a number of staff and crew members 
of the encounter with UC-56. On March 10, the body of a junior officer was found floating 
near the spot of the attack. According to The New York Times, the young man was “found to 
have two gunshot wounds, one in the neck and the other in the thigh. There was a lifebelt on 
the body.” This evidence seems to suggest that after the attack, the U-boat may have surfaced 
and attempted to cover up its crime by executing survivors. No other bodies were ever 
recovered.74 
 Following the end of the war in November 1918, the British Admiralty sought to hunt 
down and charge with war crimes those German U-boat captains who attacked clearly 
marked hospital ships. The British arrested Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Kiesewetter following 
the armistice and placed him in the Tower of London. Unfortunately, however, the British 
government’s legal department held “that England had no right to detain Kiesewetter during 
the life of the armistice.” Until a peace agreement was reached, Kiesewetter could not be 
charged with his crimes. Ultimately, Kiesewetter, who was also suspected of torpedoing the 
British Channel steamer Sussex in March 1916, never faced trial for his crimes. During the 
Second World War, he resumed command of a U-boat at the age of 62.75 
 German attacks on defenseless British hospital ships which were protected by 
international law represented the first signs to military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic 
that twentieth-century wars were to be conducted in different ways than those of the past. In 
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these new wars, bullets, torpedoes, and landmines did not discriminate. The idea of 
protection under international law became watered down and to the Germans, unrestricted 
submarine warfare truly meant unrestricted. War in the new century would be hell, and as the 
First World War proved, the Red Cross markings were no longer enough to protect hospital 
ships from the hellfire that sought to engulf them from below and above.  
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Chapter Three: American Hospital Ships in Global Combat, 1917-1945 
 
The Attack of Comfort 
 Late in the evening on April 28, 1945, the USS Comfort (AH-6) was hard at work 
evacuating casualties from the island of Okinawa in the Pacific Ocean. By then, the vicious 
Battle of Okinawa, which pitted American ground forces against staunch Japanese defenders, 
had been raging for nearly a month and the numbers of American casualties were steadily 
rising. For Comfort, and her compliment of 300 Navy and 220 Army personnel including 38 
Army nurses, the mission was simple–evacuate and treat as many American casualties as 
possible. Earlier that afternoon, Comfort did just that. With more than 600 patients filling her 
wards to capacity, the brightly illuminated hospital ship, fully clothed in the trappings of 
Geneva Convention protections, steamed hurriedly toward the Allied base hospital on the 
island of Guam.1  
 Several hours after dusk, on calm water and under the light of a full moon, Comfort’s 
crew heard the distant drone of an airplane engine coming in their direction. After several 
minutes, the plane came into view and began to circle the ship at an altitude of around 500 
feet. After several passes across the bow and stern, the plane tilted its nose toward the ship. 
In a matter of seconds, fire engulfed the vessel’s starboard side as crewmembers and nurses 
scrambled to save the lives of hundreds of patients as well as their own. This fire, however, 
was not caused by a mechanical failure on the part of the ship, nor was it the result of an 
accident in one of the ship’s wards. The explosion that rocked Comfort on the evening of 
                                                        
1 Harold F. Fultz, “Forest Fires, Lightning, and the Moon,” U.S. Navy Medicine 75, no. 4 (July-August 1984): 
9-18. 
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April 28, claiming the lives of 29 people while injuring 33 others, was the result of a 
kamikaze attack by a Japanese pilot.2 
 Japanese kamikaze attacks sought to inflict as much damage as possible on an enemy 
vessel. In theory, the sacrificing of one Japanese life in exchange for hundreds, or possible 
thousands, of Allied lives seemed to make sense. In the case of the suicide attack on Comfort, 
the pilot could not have chosen a more damaging spot upon which to crash aboard. Slamming 
directly into the starboard side amidships, the pilot struck the vessel’s superstructure as well 
as three operating rooms where surgeons, doctors, and nurses were operating on patients late 
into the night. The plane pierced the main and second decks and when the bomb on board the 
plane exploded it ripped a massive hole in the decks as well as the superstructure (Fig. 3.1). 
Thanks to quick action by her crew, as well as a bit of luck, Comfort survived the attack and 
was able to limp her way into Guam where she underwent repairs. 3   
 The attack on Comfort sent shockwaves through the soldiers on board as well as 
through Americans on the home front. Waking up the morning after the attack, readers of 
The Washington Post were greeted by the headline: “Vessel Heavily Damaged: 29 Die as 
U.S. Hospital Ship is Bombed South of Okinawa.” The column explained that “The Comfort 
was operating under full hospital ship procedure– fully marked with American Red Crosses 
plainly painted in large red blocks against her white background. She was fully lighted.”4 On 
the west coast, however, the rhetoric of the journalist Vern Haugland was much harsher. In 
                                                        
2 Dale P. Harper, Too Close for Comfort (Bloomington, IN: Trafford Publishing, 2006). 
 
3 “USS Comfort- War History,” File Number 302078221, World War II War Diaries, Other Operational 
Records and Histories, ca. 1/1/1942- ca. 6/1/1946, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
1875-2006, Record Group 38, National Archives at College Park, MD [hereafter referred to as NACP]. 
 
4 “Vessel Heavily Damaged: 29 Die as U.S. Hospital Ship is Bombed South of Okinawa,” The Washington Post 
April 30, 1945 (accessed March 12, 2019), Gale Primary Sources.  
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his column for The Los Angeles Times, carrying the headline “Jap Suicide Plane Blasts 
Hospital Ship,” Haugland condemned the kamikaze attack as “one of the most dastardly 
actions of the war.” In this column too, the author went to great lengths to clarify that the 
hospital ship was operating within the confines of the Geneva Conventions: “There was no 
chance for any kind of mistake as the attack on the unarmed vessel was in bright, full 
moonlight. The ship was brightly lighted and had clear markings identifying her as a hospital 
ship.”5 
 For those who survived 
the attack, the shock was much 
more intense and immediate. 
Having escaped the fighting on 
the cavernous hills of Okinawa, 
wounded soldiers longed for the 
safety of a hospital ship where 
the stress and pressures of 
combat no longer existed—or so 
they thought. Even those who were left physically uninjured by the attack dealt with the 
psychological ramifications. In her account of the scene, Second Lieutenant Louise Campbell 
commented that “The hardest thing for the men to take was the fact that nurses had been 
killed, injured, and horribly burned. They kept talking about it and muttering threats against 
an enemy that would willfully do such a thing.”6 
                                                        
5 Vern Haugland, “Jap Suicide Plane Blasts Hospital Ship: 29 Killed Aboard U.S.S Comfort in Attack off 
Okinawa,” The Los Angeles Times April 30, 1945 (accessed March 12, 2019), Gale Primary Sources. 
 
6 Harper, Too Close for Comfort, 65. 
Figure 3.1 Nurse surveying kamikaze damage aboard the hospital ship 
Comfort (AH-6) May 1945. Source: United States Navy, “Navy Hospitals on 
the Move,” All Hands (April, 1967), 22. 
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 The attack on Comfort was not an isolated incident. While kamikaze attacks on 
hospital ships were fairly rare occurrences during the war, as the tactic was only first 
introduced during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, Japanese pilots were known to 
harass clearly marked hospital ships. In June 1945, while serving in Saipan, American soldier 
Ted Kiely wrote a racially charged letter to his mother condemning the actions of the 
Japanese. After sustaining an injury and being loaded onto a hospital ship, a process which 
took several hours thanks to continual delays caused by attacking enemy fighters, Kiely 
wrote, “I had hardly arrived [on board] when those goddamned Japs came back and started 
attacking the hospital ships too. They love to do things like that and yet there are some 
people back home who want to give them an ‘easy’ armistice. They ought to be exterminated 
and I hope I will see the day when they are.” Kiely then reported that the attackers were 
driven off after several hours “but not until one of them crashed into a hospital ship nearby.” 
Kiely’s letter not only sheds light on the racial undertones that characterized much of the 
Second World War in the Pacific, it also helps illustrate the vulnerability of the unarmed 
American hospital ships and helps to explain why military hospital ships experienced rapid 
change after the Second World War.7 
 Following the conclusion of fighting in the First World War, the United States 
military began its initial construction on what would, by the end of 1945, become a fleet of 
nearly 40 Army and Navy hospital ships. Making an appearance in every theater of combat 
                                                        
 
7 Letter from Ted Kiely to his mother, Mrs. Julia Kiely, New York, New York, from Saipan, June-July 1945. 
“World War II,” The State Historical Society of Missouri Digital Archives, 
https://digital.shsmo.org/digital/collection/wwii/id/10773/rec/4.  
 
*Not to be confused with USS Comfort (AH-6) which served in the Pacific Theater of the Second World War or 
with USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) that currently serves as one of two hospital ships in the United States Navy. For 
hospital ships, it is especially important to know the vessels hull classification symbol as a number of these 
vessels have shared identical names throughout history. 
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across the globe, these vessels played a critical role during the Second World War. This 
chapter will briefly examine the development of the American hospital ship program during 
the interwar period as well as its experience through the period of conflict. It will then assess 
the role of U.S. Army and Navy hospital ships during the fighting against the Japanese that 
occurred in the Pacific Theater. Examining the actions of American hospital ships in that 
theater will provide the most useful information needed to determine whether or not these 
vessels were important individual components in the larger combat operation. Like Britain’s 
hospital ships in the Eastern Mediterranean Theater of the Great War, American medical 
vessels in the Pacific were under more stress than anywhere else throughout the conflict. 
Facing a tenacious enemy in harsh, tropical environments, where the resources of the medical 
services were often stretched to their breaking point, wounded American soldiers relied on 
floating medical vessels to supply them with protection from the Japanese as well as the 
medical attention that they so desperately needed.  
The experience in the Pacific precipitated a number of changes in the American 
approach to hospital ships. As the war ground on, clearly marked Geneva Convention 
hospital ships, with their sparkling white hulls and hallmark red crosses, became targets for 
enemy combatants. At the same time, there were simply not enough hospital ships to 
evacuate the number of casualties that littered the beaches of Pacific islands like Okinawa, 
and Iwo Jima. In response, American medical services adapted the relationship between the 
battlefield and the Geneva hospital ships clad only in the ink and paper armor of international 
law. They found their solution in the conversion of smaller ships, known as LSTs (Landing 
Ship, Tank) into improvised surgical and first aid centers to supplement the struggling 
hospital ships. Furthermore, as military technology advanced through the Second World War 
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and into the 1950s and 60s, evacuation by airplanes and helicopters provided useful solutions 
to a number of tactical and logistical problems that the hospital ship of the early 1900s 
seemed to present. 
The Development of United States Hospital Ship Program, 1917-1945  
 During the First World War, the United States Navy maintained three hospital ships– 
USS Comfort (AH-3)*, USS Mercy (AH-4), and USS Solace (AH-2). While Solace dated 
back to the Spanish American War, and was, according to one journalist, “utterly inadequate 
for the demands upon it,” the United States requisitioned two east coast liners early on in the 
war and converted the pair into Comfort and Mercy.8 In 1917, after entering the war on the 
side of the Allies, the US planned to send Comfort and Mercy across the Atlantic in the early 
months of 1918. The threat of destruction posed by the indiscriminate torpedoes of German 
U-boats, however, caused the Americans to reconsider. As a result, the two newly converted 
hospital ships were kept safe in ports at Norfolk and New York where they each operated as 
a base hospital until October 5, 1918. On that date, the US Navy finally sent Comfort to aid 
in the evacuation of American soldiers from the Western Front in France. However, the 
German submarines still presented a considerable danger and thus the Americans required a 
bit of trickery in order to slip across the Atlantic unharmed. To do this, Comfort left the east 
coast as a troop transport with its brilliant white hull and signature Red Cross markings 
masked beneath a thick layer of grey paint. As an added layer of protection, she travelled as 
part of an Allied convoy which grouped together troop and merchant ships with a naval 
escort to protect against the threat of the predatory German U-boats. Upon her arrival in 
Brest, France, Comfort raised the Red Cross flag and once again became a hospital ship 
                                                        
8 “Army and Navy Gossip: Merchant Ships for Hospital Duty,” The Washington Post October 17, 1917 
(accessed March 15, 2019), ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
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protected under international law. However, the warring parties were able to sign the 
Armistice of November 11, 1918 before Comfort left the European Theater which allowed 
her to carry wounded American soldiers back home without fear of being attacked.9 
 Following in the wake of the global disaster known as the Great War, the United 
States military had to make important decisions about what they would do with their small 
fleet of hospital ships now that peace had once again been restored. Naval historian Emory 
Massman notes that Mercy (AH-4) survived at least until the 1930s when she was tied up at 
the Port of Philadelphia and used to shelter homeless Americans during the Great 
Depression. As for Comfort (AH-3), her post-war story was a bit more complex. After the 
war, she returned to her previous life as a passenger-liner before resuming service in the 
Second World War as an Army transport ship (USAT Agwileon) in 1942. In August 1943, 
Atlantic Basin Iron Works in New York converted Agwileon back to her former set-up as a 
hospital ship. This time around, however, the former Navy hospital ship Comfort reemerged 
as the United States Army Hospital Ship (USAHS) Shamrock. Upon reentering the medical 
fight in World War II, Shamrock served in the Mediterranean Theater and was able to move 
11,989 casualties from the battlefield back to the United States between September 1943 and 
mid-February 1944. She returned to the Mediterranean in early May 1944 and evacuated 
more than 6,000 additional patients before returning permanently to the United States in 
September of that same year. Although she was slated to undergo ventilation alterations 
before continuing her mission in the Pacific Theater, by the end of 1945, the need for hospital 
ships had greatly diminished and Shamrock was decommissioned before 1946.10 
                                                        
9 Massman, Hospital Ships, 23. 
 
10 Roland W. Charles, Troopships of World War II (Washington, D.C.: The Army Transportation Association, 
1947), 349. 
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 Finally, USS Solace, the seasoned veteran who had been the first American hospital 
ship to fly the Red Cross flag of the Geneva Convention in 1898, continued her service into 
the early 1920s and for a few years after the war was the only hospital ship across all of the 
world powers which remained active during peace time. Although Solace did not make the 
trans-Atlantic journey to a combat theater during World War I, she was still a critical part of 
the evacuation chain for American soldiers returning to the United States. On January 1, 
1919, Solace steamed to New York to assist the USAT Northern Pacific which had run 
aground on Fire Island with a full-load of wounded veterans from France. Solace’s goal was 
to remove as many of the stranded casualties as possible and ferry them safely into New 
York. Upon her arrival, stormy weather and rough seas delayed the rescue effort by two days. 
On January 4, Solace took on 504 patients, even though her berthing capacity was only about 
200, and safely carried them into the harbor. The New York Times, praised the rescue effort. 
The rescue of the Northern Pacific and her cargo of veterans from the Western Front 
represented the culmination of Solace’s military career which spanned more than two 
decades. Following her decommission on July 20, 1921, Solace sat at the Philadelphia Naval 
Yard until November 1930 when she was finally sold for scrap metal.11 
 As the Boston Metals Company of Baltimore, Maryland physically disassembled the 
hull of the USS Solace (AH-2), at the same time they symbolically dismantled the final 
remaining vestige of America’s pre-twentieth century hospital ship program. During the 
decades between the First and Second World War, the United States hospital ship program 
experienced a sort of renaissance. Not only did the military work to construct its first 
                                                        
11 “Solace I (AH-2),” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships [hereafter referred to as DANFS], Naval 
History and Heritage Command, https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-
histories/danfs/s/solace-i.html; “Soldiers All Off Northern Pacific 247 Badly Injured Are Safely Transferred In 
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purpose-built hospital ship, USS Relief (AH-1), it also modified the ways in which it 
approached the need for Geneva-protected medical vessels. During the 1920s and 30s, the 
Army and Navy moved almost entirely away from allocating funds and other resources to the 
construction of hospital ships. As a result, when war came knocking in 1941, it was nearly 2 
years before either the Army or the Navy was able to field a specially designated hospital 
ship. 12 
 
The Red Cross Renaissance: Changes in America’s Hospital Ship Program, 1917-1945 
 The change in the American hospital ship program between the world wars began 
with the laying down of the second USS Relief (AH-1) at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 
June 14, 1917.13 For the first time in its history, the United States military allocated both time 
and resources toward the construction of a purpose-built hospital ship. Ultimately, it would 
become an important link between the First and Second World War as it served all around 
the globe from her commission on December 28, 1920 until it was sold for scrap on March 
23, 1948. On its exterior, Relief was nearly indistinguishable from the hospital ships of 
World War I. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, it wore gleaming white paint on 
her hull, which was cut in half by a thick green band to signify that it was operating as a 
military hospital ship, and carried Red Cross markings on its port and starboard sides as well 
as on its bridge and its single towering smoke stack. Inside, however, Relief was the most 
medically and technologically advanced hospital ship on the seas.14 
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13 Not to be confused with the USS Relief which served during the Spanish-American War. 
 
14 Massman, Hospital Ships, 283-285. 
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 In the August 1927 issue of Popular Science Monthly, sandwiched neatly between an 
article on the mental capacity of earthworms and a column arguing against the theory of 
evolution, sat a half-page blurb about the ultra-modern features one could find on board 
Relief. With a capacity for 550 patients, “A trip to the Relief now replaces a lengthy voyage 
to a land institution–and the vessel is said to be better equipped than many hospitals.” She 
boasted a 75-foot wide daylight operating room, a dental cabin, an x-ray room, and a fully-
stocked dispensary with enough supplies for six months of service.15 In addition, Relief 
boasted two passenger elevators as well as two freight elevators. The main elevator allowed 
access to all of the decks, from the medical store rooms in the ship’s hold all the way up to 
her superstructure and with a rated capacity of 3,500 pounds, the elevator was large enough 
to transport patients between decks. A secondary elevator connected the contagious wards 
with the main deck. This allowed soldiers with disease to be moved directly to the contagious 
ward with minimal chances of getting other soldiers sick. The third elevator ran from the 
main deck to cold food storage rooms, as well as the ship’s morgue. The fourth and final 
elevator was used for transporting baggage and ran between the main deck and the baggage 
room. Indeed, Relief was the closest thing to a land-based hospital on the sea that had ever 
been constructed. While the US military was taking its first steps toward developing its new 
hospital ship program with the construction and launch of USS Relief (AH-1), it was still to 
determine the roles of the Army and the Navy in the operation of these vessels. Would the 
branches have to co-operate in the movement of battlefield casualties away from the front 
lines? Answering this question took nearly a decade and was answered only at the expense of 
precious time and resources. Furthermore, resistance to change and inter-branch cooperation 
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stunted the once promising development of hospital ships in the United States. By the dawn 
of the Second World War, such inconsistent planning and lack of inter-branch cooperation 
led to a serious shortage of Geneva-protected vessels as American casualties started to rise 
around the globe.16  
During the peacetime of the 1920s and 30s, the military relied on its fleet of 
troopships to return sick or injured soldiers from various points around the world. With no 
wars actively raging, the army, by way of the Army Transport Service (ATS), accomplished 
this task relatively easily, relying only on the small medical wings found aboard every troop 
transport. At that moment, there was little need for a fleet of specialized and specifically 
designated floating hospitals. At the same time, the Navy was equally content to rely on their 
own troopships to transport sick and wounded sailors. In fact, they did not plan to operate 
any Geneva-protected hospital ships. The Navy most likely reached their decision based on 
the amount of time, money, and resources it took to build, or convert, specifically designated 
hospital ships. Following the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy channeled all of their 
spare funds toward rectifying the shortage in shipping caused by the destruction of the 
Japanese bombs.17    
When America entered the war, however, it became painfully clear that the medical 
wards aboard troopships would be insufficient for dealing with the number of casualties that 
required evacuation from distant, foreign theaters. However, the American military brass 
were resistant to the idea Geneva hospital ships, whether converted or purpose-built, and 
                                                        
16 Massman, Hospital Ships, 284-285. Massman goes into extensive details concerning the ship’s cost as well as 
its engines, and technical specifications.  
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continued using troopships to transport their wounded through the first year and a half of the 
war. Between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the first army hospital ships coming online in 
June 1943, “hospital ships” operated without the protections of the Geneva Convention. The 
polar opposite of their Geneva-protected counterparts, these ships were painted grey and ran 
unilluminated in order to blend in with the fleet of warships and hopefully avoid being 
attacked by the enemy. One can only speculate as to why leaders were so resistant to the 
introduction of clearly marked hospital ships. Perhaps the reason had to do with a lack of 
financial resources considering that the conversion process for each ship cost more than $1 
million. In May 1942, the Army requested authorization to use clearly marked and legally 
protected hospital ships to evacuate their casualties. In addition, they also requested that six 
unfinished hulls, which sat unfinished in American shipyards, be completed as hospital ships. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff denied their request citing a scarcity of war ships and the inability 
to sacrifice additional hulls for service as hospital ships.18   
Ultimately, however, the Army gained permission to convert a number of hulls into 
hospital ships, and when the first Geneva-protected medical vessels of World War II 
appeared in June 1943, it was primarily as a result of increasing action–as well as casualties– 
in distant theaters like the Pacific. Even though the task of converting a ship to serve as a 
floating hospital was costly, both in terms of time and money, and military planners were 
hesitant to divert their attention from the construction of warships and other battlefield 
technologies like tanks and airplanes, by the end of 1943 three converted hospital ships had 
entered the service. In the following year, fifteen more entered the field of battle, and in 
1945, American shipyards churned out six more vessels for service. At the same time, it was 
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during the war that the Army and Navy determined that they would operate hospital ships 
independently of one another. While this certainly seems to be a confusing approach, the 
differences make more sense when explained in the Army’s detailed history of the Medical 
Services in Japan. In this official record, it explains that “The Navy hospital ships were truly 
floating hospitals, with complete medical, surgical, and neuropsychiatric facilities aboard; 
additionally, by stocking medical supplies, the Navy ships could act as resupply points for 
other vessels.” On the other hand, “The Army hospital ships were less elaborate, for they 
were conceived as evacuation vessels–hospital transports– and served effectively in that role, 
returning about a sixth of the 388,000 evacuees to the United States during 1944 and the first 
half of 1945.” In total, the United States Army operated 24 hospital transports throughout the 
war. These ships served around the world, evacuating American casualties from combat 
operations in Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific. On the other hand, the US Navy operated 
15 hospital vessels that served exclusively in support of American military operations in the 
Pacific which were characterized by naval warfare on the seas and amphibious attacks led 
primarily by the US Marine Corps (see Appendix A).19 
In his 1944 report on army hospital ships in the Second World War, Harold Larson 
went to great lengths to explain the complex path that the American hospital ship program 
experienced in the interwar period through the opening years of the conflict. He posited that 
“during World War I the Navy took charge of the return of the sick and wounded to the 
United States.” When it seemed that this trend may continue into the Second World War, 
Larson recalled how Colonel Louis Milne of the Army “advanced many arguments against 
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such a transfer.” Furthermore, Col. Milne stated that “a satisfactory medical service cannot 
be established or maintained on a transport not wholly under control of the Army.” Indeed, it 
appears that infighting among the military branches led to much delay and indecision 
regarding how hospital ships would be used in the war as well as which branch would be in 
charge of said operations.20  
Even though the development of the American hospital ship program before and 
during most of the Second World War was often complicated and led to severe shortages of 
medical vessels in a number of battles across the Pacific Theater, the vessels that it was able 
to produce ultimately played an invaluable part in saving the lives of thousands of American 
servicemen. The following section will assess the performance of hospital ships in one of the 
most significant battles that occurred during the Pacific war: Iwo Jima. As in the discussion 
of the Gallipoli Campaign, the goal here is not to re-fight the battle, but rather to use it in 
more general terms to demonstrate that although their numbers were lower than military 
leaders might have wanted, American hospital ships performed well in the combat zone. 
Indeed, they were important components of warfare in the Pacific. 
 This section will consider Allied planning before the battle with particular attention 
given to the medical services. On-shore medics could do little more than provide superficial 
care for the sick and wounded. In order to receive skilled medical attention, hospital ships 
were an absolute necessity. A brief examination of the physical environment of the island 
will reveal some of the hardships that soldiers faced, as well as how seaborne medical 
transports were absolutely vital to the success of the American invasions and the subsequent 
evacuation of casualties. Finally, this section will highlight the gradual movement away from 
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the Geneva-protected hospital ship and toward the use of modified LSTs and airborne 
evacuations that became standard operating procedure for battlefield evacuation in the 
closing half of the twentieth century. 
 
American Hospital Ships in the Pacific Theater, 1945  
Battle of Iwo Jima, February-March, 1945 
 Although his report on Army hospital ships concluded in 1944, Harold Larson 
provided an overview of the current situation of the war at that time and outlined what he 
called “The Problem of the Pacific.” The problem, was that mounting casualties in the 
combat theater were overwhelming the three Navy hospital ships–Comfort (AH-6), Hope 
(AH-7), and Mercy (AH-8)–which had been assigned to the service of the Army in the area. 
“By January 1944,” Larson wrote, “it became apparent that additional hospital ship space 
would be required for the Pacific.” By 1945, three additional Army hospital ships made their 
way to the Pacific thus increasing the overall number of vessels in the theater. However, at 
the Battle of Iwo Jima, in early 1945, only four hospital ships were present to receive 
battlefield casualties.21 
 After successfully making their way across the islands of the South and Central 
Pacific, and seizing key points like the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana Islands through costly 
and bloody engagements at Tarawa, Saipan, Eniwetok, and Guam, US forces fixed their 
sights on obtaining a staging area for aerial bombardment of the Japanese mainland. The 
small island of Iwo Jima, some 750 miles south of Tokyo, presented the perfect staging 
ground. Moreover, the island’s Japanese defenders had already completed part of the work 
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for the Americans by constructing airfields for use in their own aerial attacks during the 
previous year. By seizing the island’s three Japanese controlled airfields, Iwo Jima would 
become, for all intents and purposes, an unsinkable American aircraft carrier permanently 
anchored off the southern coast of Japan. From this “carrier,” the United States would be able 
to launch B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers, escorted by P-51 Mustangs, against the heavily 
defended island of Okinawa, as well as the Japanese mainland itself.22 
 The responsibility for invading and capturing the island fell in large part to the 5th 
Amphibious Corps of the United States Marines. In preparation for the Marine assault on Iwo 
Jima (codenamed Operation Detachment), ensuring the availability of adequate medical 
resources became a top priority. Field medics of the Fifth Amphibious Corps would be 
responsible for providing emergency medical care to troops who sustained injuries during the 
invasion of the island. The day after the invasion commenced, two Navy hospital ships, 
Solace (AH-5) and Samaritan (AH-10), arrived at Iwo Jima to assist in the clearing of 
casualties. The responsibility for evacuating casualties fell to a number of troop transports 
which sat waiting off the coast of the island. These transports were ill prepared to carry and 
treat the large number of casualties that fell in the opening phases of the battle. Fighting on 
Iwo Jima was brutal, and in order to supplement the struggling medical services, hospital 
ships became a dire necessity. 
  In a March 1945 column for Life, Robert Sherrod, a war correspondent for Life and 
Time magazines recalled the carnage he witnessed on the opening day of the invasion. “It 
was sickening to watch the Jap mortar shells crash into the men…along the beach…lay many 
dead.” Of these dead men, Sherrod noted that “They had died with the greatest possible 
                                                        
22 Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, Medical Services in the War Against Japan, 385. 
Franklin 99 
 
 
violence.” Sherrod covered the American war effort across thousands of miles of the massive 
Pacific Theater, but nowhere else had he seen “such badly mangled bodies. Many were cut 
squarely in half. Legs and arms lay 50 ft. away from anybody.” After the invasion was over, 
Sherrod hopped aboard a troopship which would carry him to his next assignment. Once 
onboard, one of the doctors told him “that 90% of the wounded will require major surgery.”  
It became clear that the American military’s lack of foresight with regard to its hospital ship 
program after the First World War had a negative impact when it found itself embroiled in 
dangerous amphibious invasions during the Second.23 
 On Iwo Jima, members of the land-based medical services fared little better than the 
wounded men they were tasked to treat. In one particularly brutal scene, which occurred on 
the third day of the fight, a landing group of Marines came across one of the handful of aid 
stations on the island. They immediately noticed that the aid station had been hit. “There 
were broken plasma bottles hanging from rifles and a long stream of bandage unrolled neat 
and white across the black sand. Cots and crates and blankets were all smashed together and 
big, tarry clots of blood and flesh were plastered over everything.24 Another young medical 
officer recalled in his post-war writings that “There was usually one doctor manning an aid 
station, but all he did was sort of duck, slap on bandages, try to stop hemorrhages, and get the 
guy to where somebody else could do definitive care.” Furthermore, he remarked that 
“Everything was dirty and in the open, so it was tough to try to do any type of skilled 
medicine during the actual battle.” While intense combat raged between the Marines and the 
                                                        
23 Helling, Desperate Surgery in the Pacific, 254; Robert Sherrod, “Iwo Jima: The First Three Days,” Life, 
March 5, 1945, 44. 
 
24 Corrado Cagli, “Rest Camp on Maui: A Story,” Harper’s, July 1946, 83-90. 
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Japanese, as with the British at Gallipoli, military forces at Iwo Jima were continuously 
engaged with that ever present third army—the environment.25   
Sulphur Island: The Environment and the Battle of Iwo Jima 
 In the months leading up to the battle on Iwo Jima, both sides understood that the 
small island carried major strategic importance. With their fleet having been essentially 
destroyed during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October of the previous year, the Japanese goal 
at Iwo Jima was to slow down the American advance toward the home island. Under the 
direction of Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, a garrison of more than 20,000 
Japanese soldiers set to work using the environment of the island to their defensive 
advantage. In the volcanic soil of Iwo Jima, Japanese soldiers constructed a tunnel network 
which stretched more than 11 miles. Complete with command and observation posts, as well 
as recessed firing positions for heavy artillery, these tunnels provided natural protection and a 
subterranean home for the island’s defenders. As a result of their successful alliance with 
nature, Iwo Jima would become the only battle of the Pacific War in which the attackers 
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suffered higher casualties than the defenders.26 In terms of its physical geography, Iwo Jima 
was unique (Figure 3.2). On the southern half of the island, the 556 ft. Mount Suribachi, a 
dormant volcano and home to more than 2,000 dug-in Japanese soldiers, dominated the 
landscape. From the base of 
Suribachi, the ground to the 
north rose steadily in a series of 
steppes which housed the three 
airfields. On the northernmost 
part of island, the loose, sandy 
terrain fell into a series of 
winding gorges and canyons. 
The harsh geography and terrain 
of Iwo Jima limited the number 
of options available to the 
American invasion force. While 
the island lacked any coral 
reefs, which had caused a great 
deal of problems at early amphibious landings such as those at Tarawa, its steep and sharply 
terraced beaches left few viable landing locations. Ultimately, the Americans selected a 
narrow strip of beach on the southeast side of the island as the point of their initial thrust. 
This spot would provide them the greatest potential for a successful invasion of the island.27 
                                                        
26 Michael Stephenson, ed., Battlegrounds: Geography and the History of Warfare (Washington D.C.: National 
Geographic, 2003), 88-89. 
 
27 Stephenson, Battlegrounds, 89. 
Figure 3.2 United States Marine Corps map of Iwo Jima. Source: 
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-C-Iwo/index.html.  
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  After landing on the beach, they aimed to push forward and cut off Mt. Suribachi and 
the southern tip from the rest of the island. After firmly establishing themselves in this 
location, they would push north and drive the Japanese into the sea. However, the loose, 
volcanic soil on the island made it difficult for landing parties to make their way off the 
beaches. Corporal Edward Hartman, a rifleman in the 24th Marines remarked that moving 
across the thick granules “was like trying to run in a vat of coffee grounds.” Lt. Charlie 
Hatch, a Marine dentist, noted that “When you tried to run from one shell hole to another for 
cover, just a few yards made you winded.”28 To make the situation even more unpleasant, the 
island reeked with the stench of rotten eggs caused by natural sulfuric gases that emanated 
from inside the volcanic island in a yellow-brown mist. Mixed with the smell of thousands of 
rotting corpses, the smell of the island remained with several veterans for decades after the 
war ended.29 
 The unforgiving tropical moonscape of Iwo Jima, with enemy combatants tunneled 
beneath it, made it difficult for land-based medics to establish aid stations and provide 
necessary medical care to the rising number of casualties. Narrow, dangerous beaches also 
meant that casualties needed to be cleared away as soon as possible or risk ending up like the 
men described by Robert Sherrod. The complicated environmental factors at Iwo Jima meant 
that hospital ships would once again be required to carry wounded American soldiers away 
from the frontlines of battle.  
 In October 1944, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. 
Pacific Fleet and the Pacific Ocean Areas, sent a memo to Admiral William Halsey and 
                                                        
28 Alice T. Clark and Robert D. Eldridge, “Heroes of Iwo Jima,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2006. 
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expressed his concerns about casualties sustained in amphibious action and the role of 
hospital ships. In it, he wrote that “Better evacuation performance would be achieved by 
having hospital ships soon after [amphibious attacks commence] and stand in as close to the 
beach as possible…In other words, the hospital ships would be used as floating hospitals 
earlier in the assault phase rather than as floating ambulances later.” In the mind of Admiral 
Nimitz, the difficulty in establishing hospital facilities on land meant that medical vessels 
were needed to act as permanent hospitals off the coast. Instead of continuing with the 
familiar “scoop and sail” tactics, meaning that a hospital ship received casualties and then 
left for the nearest base hospital, in his plan the hospital ship would become the base hospital. 
With casualty numbers rising from the numerous amphibious assaults across the Central 
Pacific, Admiral Nimitz believed that the presence of hospital ships would not only enhance 
the care of the wounded, but help increase the morale of the soldiers on shore.30 
 The Battle of Iwo Jima was the first opportunity for Nimitz’s plan to be put into 
action, although it was not successfully implemented until the ensuing Battle of Okinawa in 
the following month. While Solace and Mercy did not arrive to the island until the day after 
the initial invasion began, they performed incredibly well and certainly met the expectations 
for a hospital ship outlined in the opening decades of the twentieth century. Upon her arrival 
to Iwo on February 23, Samaritan received her full capacity of 609 patients in just a few 
hours and took off for the Allied base hospital in Saipan. Of those 609 patients, only eight 
died during the course of the journey.31 The Solace too had a positive impact on casualty 
evacuation proceedings at Iwo Jima. Arriving on February 23, it received 639 casualties and 
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departed for the Marianas the next day. In total, Solace completed three runs between the 
Marianas and Iwo Jima. In that span, it was able to treat a total of 1,887 men. In all, 
American hospital ships at Iwo Jima successfully evacuated and cared for 4,879 casualties 
during the course of the battle. According to one observer, “the care and evacuation of 
casualties [at Iwo Jima] was handled better than at any previous operation in the central 
Pacific area.”32  
 The commendable performances of Solace and Samaritan were incredibly important 
for the American evacuation at Iwo Jima. However, the lack of even more badly needed 
hospital ships in the combat area necessitated a bit of improvisation on the part of American 
medical planners. At the same time, when the two hospital ships left the island to carry their 
passengers to distant base hospitals, this left a massive gap in the medical services that 
needed to be filled. Military leaders found the answer to their problem in the form of 
versatile, well-armed landing ships known as LSTs. 
   First utilized in the Pacific at the Battle of Peleliu in the final months of 1944, LST 
vessels converted into floating hospitals (LST(H) for hospital) were used by American forces 
to supplement the lack of specially designated hospital ships. LSTs were ocean-going 
vehicles with a large bow door that would fold out into a ramp and allow for the loading and 
unloading of cargo. Americans relied on LSTs in support of amphibious invasions in nearly 
every combat theater of the Second World War. They played a critical part in the invasion, 
and subsequent casualty evacuations, at Iwo Jima (Figure 3.3).  
                                                        
32 David A. Lane, “Hospital Ship Doctrine in the United States Navy: The Halsey Effect on Scoop and Sail 
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 Although originally designed to 
carry large combat tanks from the sea to the 
shore, LSTs could also be utilized to carry 
smaller vehicles, as well as troops, if 
necessary. American Mark II LSTs were 
327 feet long and 50 feet wide. With a 
loaded draught of 8ft 2in, these cargo 
haulers could travel into extremely shallow 
water before lowering their massive ramp 
and loading or unloading their cargo. In 
addition to their versatility, they were also 
armed. The LST’s on-board arsenal 
included one 76mm cannon, six 40mm 
anti-aircraft guns, six 20mm guns, two 
.50cal machine guns, and four .30cal machine guns. In short, LSTs did not fall under the 
Geneva Convention protections afforded to specially designated hospital ships like Comfort 
and Samaritan.33 
 During the Battle of Iwo Jima, the Americans relied on LST(H)s to carry casualties 
from the clearing stations on the beaches to the hospital ships, or more often troop transports, 
that waited out at sea. On average, this journey took approximately six hours. However, in 
some cases it could take as long as fifteen hours. One of the primary functions of the LST(H) 
during this time was to separate casualties based on their severity. Surgeons and medical staff 
                                                        
33 Helling, Desperate Surgery in the Pacific, 254. 
Figure 3.3 Five LSTs and one Landing Ship, Medium (LSM) 
unloading cargo on the dark sandy beaches of Iwo Jima. Mt. 
Surabachi can be seen looming in the background. Source: 
Mitch Weiss, “Gunboats in Hell: Battle at Iwo Jima,” Army 
Times Magazine, February 17, 2018, 
https://www.armytimes.com/news/2018/02/17/gunboats-in-
hell-battle-at-iwo-jima/.          
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onboard the vessels would treat those men who required immediate lifesaving attention while 
they were being ferried to the large ships waiting offshore. For those suffering from minor 
injuries, the staff onboard the LST(H) would provide the necessary medical treatment and 
send the soldier back to the beach as quickly as possible so that they might rejoin the fight. In 
order to adequately serve these functions, hospital LSTs had to be refit with many of the 
same technologies and apparatus that one would find on a hospital ship.34  
Following a number of minor alterations after a fairly unimpressive initial appearance 
at Peleliu, the LST(H)s at Iwo Jima were much improved. Five surgeons manned each vessel, 
accompanied by dozens of corpsmen. The vessel housed an operating room, complete with 
surgical table, lights, and instruments, and could accommodate up to 400 patients. As the 
battle commenced, American military leaders did not suspect that the lack of hospital ships 
would present such a serious problem and believed that the allocated medical resources 
would be able to provide sufficient care. Thankfully, the LST(H)s performed even better than 
the designated hospital ships—especially during the opening days of the invasion before 
Solace and Samaritan arrived.35 In the first and second day of the fight, the LST(H)s were 
overwhelmed with the number of casualties requiring medical attention, but were still able to 
provide necessary care. By the afternoon of the second day, LST(H)s had received, in sum, 
more than 4,956 casualties; almost 100 more than the total number of casualties carried by 
two designated hospital ships across the entire engagement.36 
                                                        
34 Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, Medical Services in the War Against Japan, 386-387. 
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American hospital ships and LST(H)s at Iwo Jima were undoubtedly essential to the 
success of casualty evacuations. It was not the ships, however, that provided the medical 
attention that thousands so desperately needed. Rather it was the surgeons, doctors, and 
nurses onboard who worked for days on end to ensure that as many men as possible made it 
home. In his history of doctors and damage control in the Pacific Theater of World War II, 
Dr. Thomas Helling, a professor of surgery and former member of the US Army Medical 
Corps, describes some of the challenges that combat surgeons faced as new battlefield 
technologies led to some of the most gruesome injuries imaginable. As he explains, “Many 
men at Iwo Jima suffered abdominal trauma [as a result of high explosives]—colon 
disruptions, liver bleeding, kidney damage—that carried some of the highest death rates of 
any war wound.” In a period of 50 hours, a Stanford trained surgeon named Frederic Shidler, 
performed extensive operations on twelve consecutive abdominal wounds. Eight of the men 
had intestinal injuries that required repair, one Marine had eviscerated about four feet of 
small bowel, two colons had to be repaired and exteriorized, and one man sustained a rectal 
injury which required repair and colostomy. Dr. Helling comments that “to the lay person 
such surgical feats aboard a ship were astounding. It was as if God himself was guiding their 
hands.”37 
At the end of the fighting, on March 26, 1945, the struggle for Iwo Jima had become 
the bloodiest conflict of the entire Pacific War. According to historian John Costello, “Only 
216 Japanese were taken alive out of a garrison of 20,000.” On the other side, wresting Iwo 
Jima from the hands of General Kuribayashi and his men cost the Marines 25,000 wounded 
and 6,000 dead, a casualty rate of 1.25 to 1 that was the highest in the history of the branch. 
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The massive amount of blood spilled to gain a few square miles of foul-smelling lava rock 
certainly foreshadowed what was still to come at the penultimate conflict on the island of 
Okinawa. There, too, hospital ships would play a critical role in the evacuation of American 
wounded.38 At Iwo Jima, however, the performance of US Navy hospital ships and LST(H)s 
ensured that thousands of soldiers found their way off the island alive. The American 
experience on Sulphur Island also helped establish the blueprint that they would use to 
evacuate casualties in the ensuing battle of Okinawa. One which ultimately opened the door 
for the United States to end the war in the Pacific. In the same way that Britain’s hospital 
ships at Gallipoli three decades earlier had managed to keep an isolated failure of command 
from spiraling into a conflict wide catastrophe, American hospital vessels, both inside and 
outside of the protections of international law, saved thousands of lives which may have 
otherwise been lost. With these facts in mind, it becomes clear that Anglo-American hospital 
ships involved in the First and Second World Wars of the early twentieth century were 
invaluable components of combat operations. To those whose lives they saved, they surely 
symbolized the Good Samaritan. They were bastions of comfort, solace, mercy, and repose.
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Epilogue:  
 Hospital Ships in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century 
 
In the summer of 2005, Dr. Arthur M. Smith published an article in the Naval War 
College Review titled, “Has the Red Cross-Adorned Hospital Ship Become Obsolete?” 
Having served as a medical officer in the US Navy during the Vietnam War, Smith wonders 
whether the Geneva-protected hospital ship has run its course. In his introduction, he 
explains that his article is in response to an earlier piece by Richard Grunawalt, titled 
“Hospital Ships in the War on Terror: Sanctuaries or Targets?” in which he argues that 
modern hospital ships protected under the Geneva Convention should “be armed with 
encrypted communications, machine guns, defensive chaff, and Phalanx missiles” in order to 
protect themselves from attacks by enemy combatants. Smith agrees with Grunwalt, but takes 
his suggestions one step further. Instead of simply adding offensive and defensive 
capabilities to hospital ships protected by international law, Smith suggests that international 
law should be removed altogether. To support his argument, Dr. Smith cites the performance 
of American LST(H) at Iwo Jima and Okinawa: “LSTs were able to provide sophisticated 
surgical care in relatively safe environments close to shore. Operating without Geneva 
Convention protection, they performed effectively, even under fire.”1 
In many ways, Smith is correct to question whether or not Geneva protected hospital 
ships have become obsolete. For example, in the wake of the Second World War, the United 
States fleet of 39 Army and Navy hospital ships shrank drastically. Today, the Navy operated 
Comfort (T-AH-20) and Mercy (T-AH-19) are the only two hospital ships at America’s 
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disposal. In Great Britain, there are no longer any Geneva-protected hospital ships. What, 
then, were the changes that occurred during the course of the later twentieth-century to 
precipitate such a large drop in the use of and need for hospital ships? How exactly did 
hospital ships make the transition from bastion to burden?  
One might answer these questions in several ways. First, by the end of World War II, 
the protections of the Geneva Convention and international law represented a hindrance to 
the effective use of hospital ships on the front lines of combat operations. Second, advances 
in technology pushed the old, outdated hospital ships of the early 1900s into the background. 
With the improvement of military aircraft, like planes and helicopters, massive lumbering 
ships were no longer the preferred method of evacuation. Finally, and perhaps most 
interestingly, the decline in the military application of hospital ships is due in part to the 
changing nature of warfare. Compared to conflicts like the American Civil War, which often 
produced several thousand casualties per battle, warfare in the twenty-first century is 
relatively tame. As a result, casualty evacuation generally especially for sickness and disease, 
is no longer as highly prioritized as it has been in past conflicts.  
Nailed to the Red Cross: The Hindrance of Geneva Markings 
In 1945, an article published in All Hands, an informational bulletin for naval 
personal, provided some of the earliest discussion as to whether or not it was time to move 
away from the Geneva Convention markings that adorned the exterior of American hospital 
ships. In a column titled, “‘Immune to Attack’—?” author Dick McCann wrote that 
“Supposedly, hospital ships are immune from attack. They are always painted white with a 
wide green band painted around the hull and large Red Crosses marking them for 
identification.” After explaining that these markings originated in the Hague and Geneva 
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Conventions of the early 1900s, and were intended to protect hospital ships from enemy 
violence, McCann lamented: “However, in both World War I and World War II, hospital 
ships have been hit.2 
Aside from the fact that the protections of international law seemed to be rather 
useless at safeguarding hospital ships from the nefarious whims of enemy combatants, the 
attention that they brought to the vessel—and more importantly those around it—had the 
effect of isolating brightly painted and full-illuminated hospital ships from the rest of the 
fleet. Hospital ships stood out when grouped together in a crowd. This ran directly against 
the goals of warships who sought to remain undetectable to enemy fighters (Figure 3.4) . As 
a result, by World War II, 
the markings meant to 
protect hospital ships from 
danger actually put them 
into positions where they 
were forced to travel on 
their own without the 
nearby protection of an 
armed escort. As Admiral 
Nimitz mentioned in his 
1944 memo to Halsey: 
“Amphibious commanders do not like brilliantly illuminated hospital ships in the immediate 
vicinity of the objectives.” Furthermore, in his post-war reminiscence on his time as 
                                                        
2 Dick McCann, “Our Growing Mercy Fleet,” All Hands (August, 1945): 11. 
Figure 3.4 Even at great distance, the white exterior of the Samaritan (AH-10) is 
easily visible in the mass assembly of grey-hulled ships off the coast of Iwo Jima, 
1945. Source: Mitch Weiss, “Gunboats in Hell: Battle at Iwo Jima,” Army Times 
Magazine, February 17, 2018, 
https://www.armytimes.com/news/2018/02/17/gunboats-in-hell-battle-at-iwo-jima/.          
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Commander of Comfort (AH-6) Harold F. Fultz wrote about a series of natural forest fires 
that raged for weeks in the costal hardwood forests of New Guinea and the Philippines. He 
explained that light from the blaze often allowed ships to spot dangerous navigational 
hazards in the water before they caused damage to the ship. “Perhaps no type of vessel 
benefited more from these natural lighthouses than a hospital ship. Steaming almost 
continuously and alone…she needed every possible clue to check her position.” Here, again, 
the “blinding illumination” required by hospital ships for protection under international law 
forced them to travel away from the rest of the fleet. Indeed, the writings of McCann, Nimitz, 
and Fultz seem to suggest that by the end of the Second World War, the ink and paper armor 
provided by international law had helped turn those vessels into burdens.3 
Saviors from Above: The Introduction of Airplane and Helicopter Evacuation 
 
The second factor that led to the gradual decline of hospital ships after the Second 
World War was the introduction of new evacuation methods, namely the helicopter, and the 
improvement of existing technologies like the airplane. The comparative speed, safety, and 
efficiency of airborne medical evacuations played a part in pushing the hospital ship away 
from the forefront of military leaders’ minds. Even during the Battle of Iwo Jima, airplanes 
were used to evacuate battlefield casualties. One squadron of R4D Transport (twin engine C-
47 Skytrains) and one squadron of Navy sea planes, staffed by five medical officers and 24 
nurses, evacuated 2,237 patients from the island during the course of the battle.4 
During the Korean and Vietnam Wars which followed in the decades after World 
War II, the helicopter developed into one of the primary means of casualty evacuation. Able 
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to access virtually any point on a battlefield, regardless of environmental obstacles, military 
helicopters provided a new level of flexibility to the medical services. Hospital ships, 
however, were not entirely phased out after the Second World War. On the contrary, veterans 
of World War II, like Consolation, Haven, and Repose assumed new positions in the 
evacuation chain. Instead of having to be present on the front lines to receive casualties from 
seaborne transport vessels, with retrofitted helipads the ships could now anchor far away 
from the combat zone while a constant stream of helicopters delivered battlefield casualties 
directly onto their decks. This system began during the Korean War and has continued 
through to the modern day. In this role, the usefulness of hospital ships started to return. 
Although they were no longer the glorious saviors that reached out and plucked the wounded 
soldiers from the fires of Gallipoli and Iwo Jima, in this new capacity they would still be able 
to provide care to those whom the helicopters delivered.5 
Decreasing Costs: Warfare in the 21st Century 
 
Finally, the ever-changing face of warfare is one of the major factors that has 
contributed to the historical ebb and flow of hospital ships utility in combat. According to 
statistics provided by Friends Committee of National Legislation, in the nearly two decades 
since 2001, 45,170 U.S. troops have been wounded in war. In that same period, 6,241 troops 
have been killed in war. When one compares those figures to the 25,000 wounded and the 
6,000 killed in a period of just over a month on Iwo Jima, and the more than 160,000 British 
casualties incurred in ten months at Gallipoli, it becomes clear that war in the twenty-first 
century is no longer as costly, in terms of human life, as it was in the twentieth. As a result, 
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the need for large fleets of hospital ships is no longer as pressing as it was during the 
conflicts of the early 1900s.6 
Today, the United States is still grappling with questions concerning their two aging 
hospital ships. As recently as June 2018, an article published in Stars and Stripes magazine 
carried the headline “Navy’s Hospital Ships Will Remain Afloat Despite Talks of Scrapping 
One to Cut Costs,” signaling that the burden of these vessels may once again be increasing. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, Great Britain is considering reacquiring hospital ships for 
its fleet. In January 2019, Member of Parliament Penny Mordaunt proposed that some of the 
country’s foreign aid budget be used to construct hospital ships to provide humanitarian aid 
in disaster zones. At present, providing humanitarian relief, as opposed to treating battlefield 
casualties, is the primary function of all existing hospital ships. For example, although 
Comfort (T-AH-20) and Mercy (T-AH-19) entered the Persian Gulf during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (2003), they mostly provided medical care to Iraqi civilians and prisoners of war in 
need of attention. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Comfort responded to 
New York City where she provided shelter, food, laundry services, and treatment to relief 
workers.7 
In the history of warfare, hospital ships stand out as interesting figures. In the early 
twentieth century, the great European powers battled one another in a bitter arms race which 
ultimately led to the outbreak of the first world-wide conflict. Their goal was to ensure that 
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their nations maintained the greatest military capacity to inflict fatal damage on anyone who 
challenged their supremacy. At the exact same moment, individuals like Belgrave Ninnis, P. 
Murray Braidwood, and F.H.A. Clayton sought to develop a means for saving the lives of 
those who war intended to eviscerate. The military hospital ship and the men and women that 
served aboard them were to provide a small beacon of light to the men on shore who were in 
desperate need of a savior. During the First and Second World Wars, these ships performed 
their duties with courage and tenacity. In the face of German torpedoes and Japanese 
kamikazes, hospital ships kept their beacons lit. They became bastions to those sick and 
injured soldiers who found themselves on distant, foreign beaches fighting against man and 
nature. Though no longer a priority among modern militaries, hospital ships were invaluable 
components to those that fought in the wars of the early twentieth century. They provided 
life-saving treatment to soldiers who would have otherwise perished—suffering and alone—
far, far from home.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Franklin 116 
 
 
Bibliography  
Primary Sources  
Monographs and Memoirs  
Baker, Jean. A Marine at Gallipoli and On the Western Front: First In, Last Out- The Diary 
of Harry Askin. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Publishing, 2015. 
 
Larson, Harold. Army Hospital Ships in World War II. Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief 
of Transportation, 1944. 
 
Nightingale, Florence A. A Contribution to the Sanitary History of the British Army during 
the Late War with Russia. London: Harrison and Sons, 1859. 
 
Olmstead, Frederick Law. Hospital Transports: A Memoir of the Embarkation of the Sick 
and Wounded from the Peninsula of Virginia in the Summer of 1862. Boston, Mass.: 
Ticknor and Fields, 1863. 
 
Scott, James Brown, ed. The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1915.  
 
Silas, Ellis. Crusading with the ANZAC A.D. 1915. London: British-Australasian, 1916. 
 
Unknown. The War on Hospital Ships: With Narratives of Eye-Witnesses and British and 
German Diplomatic Correspondence. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1918. 
 
Wheeler, Richard. The Bloody Battle for Suribachi. New York: Thomas Y. Crowley 
Company, 1965. 
 
Journal Articles 
 
“German War Trials: Judgement in the Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt.” The 
American Journal of International Law 16, no. 4 (1922): 708-724. 
 
“Medical History of the War in China.” British Medical Journal 2, no. 99 (November 22, 
1862): 539-540. 
 
“Naval and Military Medical Services.” The British Medical Journal 2 (Sept. 11, 1897): 686. 
 
“Report of the Sanitary Commission on HMS Victor Emanuel and her Invalids.” The Lancet 
103, no. 2642 (April 18, 1874): 550-551. 
 
“The Hospital Ship Nubia.” The British Medical Journal 1, no. 2059 (June 16, 1900): 1495-
1496. 
 
Franklin 117 
 
 
Braidwood, P. Murray. “Hospital Accommodation by the Use of Ships (Hospital Ships).” 
The Lancet 147, no. 3788 (April 4, 1896): 914-918. 
 
__________________. “An Ocean Ambulance.” The British Medical Journal 1, no. 1883 
(Jan. 30, 1897): 303. 
 
Clayton, F.H.A. “The Disposal of Wounded in Naval Actions.” The British Medical Journal 
2, no. 2121 (Aug. 24, 1901): 454-455. 
 
Hamilton, Ian. “Operations in the Dardanelles: The Difficulties of the Medical Service.” The 
British Medical Journal 2, no. 2856 (Sep. 25, 1915): 482-483. 
 
Hewitt, Walker D. “The Treatment of Wounded in Naval Warfare.” The British Medical 
Journal 2, no. 2799 (Aug. 22, 1914): 357-359. 
 
McCann, Dick. “Our Growing Mercy Fleet.” All Hands (August, 1945): 8-11. 
 
Ninnis, Belgrave. “Floating Hospitals.” The British Medical Journal 2, no. 2121 (August 24, 
1901): 456-457. 
 
Watson, William. “Some Observations upon Mr. Sutton’s Invention to Extract the Foul and 
Stinking Air from the Well and Other Parts of Ships, with Critical Remarks upon the 
Use of Windsails.” Philosophical Transactions (1683-1775) 42, (1742-1743): 62-70. 
 
 
Archival Records 
 
“Letters from the First World War.” Great Western Railway Company: Miscellaneous Books 
and Records, RAIL 253/516, National Archives of the United Kingdom. 
 
“Plans for the Hospital Ship U.S.S. Relief (AH-1).” Ship Engineering Drawings, ca. 1940- ca. 
1966; Records of the Bureau of Ships, 1940-1966, Record Group 19, National 
Archives Building, College Park, Maryland. 
 
“USS Comfort-War History.” File Number 202078221, World War II War Diaries, Other 
Operational Records and Histories, ca. 1/1/1942- ca. 6/1/1946, Records of the Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1875-2006, Record Group 38, National Archives 
Building, College Park, Maryland. 
 
Official Records 
Appleman, Roy E, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens. The War in the 
Pacific: Okinawa: The Last Battle. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 
1994. 
 
Franklin 118 
 
 
Charles, Roland W. Troopships of World War II. Washington, D.C.: The Army 
Transportation Association, 1947. 
 
Condon-Rall, Mary Ellen, and Albert E. Cowdrey. United States Army in World War II, The 
Technical Services, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against 
Japan. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998. 
 
Newspaper Titles 
 
The New York Times  
The Times of London 
The Los Angeles Times 
The Wisconsin Register 
 London Illustrated News 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Monographs 
 
Barker, Marianne. Nightingales in the Mud: the Digger Sisters of the Great War, 1914-1918. 
Crow’s Nest, AU: Allen and Uwin, 1989. 
 
Bassett, Jan. Guns and Brooches: Australian Army Nursing from the Boer War to the Gulf 
War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
Bennett, Judith A. Natives and Exotics: World War II and Environment in the Southern 
Pacific. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009. 
 
Brady, Lisa. War upon the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern 
Landscapes during the American Civil War. Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 
2012. 
 
Clodfelter, Michael. Warfare and Armed Conflict: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty 
and Other Figures, 1492-2015. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. Inc., 2017. 
 
Closmann, Charles E., ed. War and the Environment: Military Destruction in the Modern 
Age. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2009. 
 
Costello, John. The Pacific War, 1941-1945. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1981. 
 
Fleck, Dieter, Michael Bothe, Horst Fischer, Hans-Peter Gasser, Christopher J. Greenwood, 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Knut Ipsen, Stefan Oeter, Karl Joseph Partsch, Walter 
Rabus, and Rüdiger Wolfrum, eds. The Handbook of Humanutarian Law in Armed 
Conflicts. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
Friedenberg, Zachary B. Medicine Under Sail. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 
Franklin 119 
 
 
 
Gabriel, Richard A. Between Flesh and Steel: A History of Military Medicine from the 
Middle Ages to the War in Afghanistan. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2013. 
 
Gariepy, Patrick. Garden of Hell: Battles of the Gallipoli Campaign. Lincoln, NE: Potomac 
Books, 2014. 
 
Goodman, Rupert. Our War Nurses. Queensland, AU: Boolarong Press, 1988. 
 
Haller Jr., John S. Battlefield Medicine: A History of the Military Ambulance from the 
Napoleonic Wars to World War I. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2011. 
 
Hallett, Christine E. Veiled Warriors: Allied Nurses of the First World War. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014.  
 
Hargrave, John. The Suvla Bay Landing. London, 1964. 
 
Harper, Dale P. Too Close for Comfort. Bloomington, IN: Trafford Publishing, 2006. 
 
Harrison, Mark. The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First World War. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Hart, Peter. Gallipoli. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
Haythornthwaite, Philip. Gallipoli 1915: Frontal Assault on Turkey. Oxford, UK: Osprey 
Publishing, 1991. 
 
Helling, Thomas. Desperate Surgery in the Pacific War: Doctors and Damage Control for 
American Wounded, 1941-1945. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. Inc., 2017. 
 
Jones, Marian Moser. The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. 
 
Keegan, John. The Face of Battle. New York: Penguin Books, 1976. 
 
Laakkonen, Simo, Richard Tucker, and Timo Vuorisalo, eds. The Long Shadows: A Global 
Environmental History of the Second World War. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State 
University Press, 2017. 
 
Lambert, Andrew D. The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy Against Russia, 1853-1856. 
Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990. 
 
Last, John M., ed. A Dictionary of Public Health. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Franklin 120 
 
 
Massman, Emory A. Hospital Ships of World War II: An Illustrated Reference. Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Co. Inc., 1999. 
 
Mayhew, Emily. Wounded: A New History of the Western Front in World War I. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016. 
 
Mongan, Cheryl and Richard Reid. We Have Not Forgotten: Yass & Districts War, 1914-
1918. Milltown Research and Publications, 1997. 
 
Plumridge, John H. Hospital Ships and Ambulance Trains. London: Seeley, 1975. 
 
Royle, Trevor. Crimea: The Great Crimean War, 1854-1856. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2000. 
 
Stephenson, Michael. Battlegrounds: Geography and the History of Warfare. Washington 
D.C.: National Geographic, 2003. 
 
Symonds, Craig L. The U.S. Navy: A Concise History. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016. 
 
Trask, David. The War with Spain in 1898. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. 
 
Travers, Tim. Gallipoli, 1915. Stroud, UK: The History Press, 2009. 
 
Tucker, Richard P., and Edmund Russell, eds. Natural Enemy, Natural Ally: Toward an 
Environmental History of Warfare. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 
2004. 
 
Tucker, Richard P., Tait Keller, J.R. McNeil, and Martin Schmid., eds. Environmental 
Histories of the First World War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
 
Tucker, Spencer C., ed. American Civil War: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document 
Collection. Oxford, UK: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2013. 
 
Winters, H.A. Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 
 
Witt, John Fabian, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History. New York: Free 
Press, 2012. 
 
Journal Articles 
Clark, Alice T. and Robert D. Eldridge, “Heroes of Iwo Jima,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 
2006. 
 
Franklin 121 
 
 
Doyle, Peter and Matthew R. Bennett. “Military Geography: The Influence of Terrain in the 
Outcome of the Gallipoli Campaign, 1915.” The Geographical Journal 165, no. 1 
(March 1999): 12-36. 
 Fultz, Harold F. “Forest Fires, Lightning, and the Moon.” U.S. Navy Medicine 75, no. 4 
 (July- August 1984): 9-18. 
 
Gill, Christopher J. and Gillian C. Gill. “Nightingale in Scutari: Her Legacy Reexamined.” 
Clinical Infectious Diseases 40, no. 12 (June 2005): 1799-1805. 
  
 Grunwalt, Richard. “Hospital Ships in the War on Terror: Sanctuaries or Targets?” Naval 
 War College Review 58, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 89-119. 
  
 Lane, David A. “Hospital Ship Doctrine in the United States Navy: The Halsey Effect on 
 Scoop and Sail Tactics.” Military Medicine 162, no. 6 (1997): 388-395. 
 
Riske, Milt. “A History of Hospital Ships.” Sea Classics (March 1973). 
  
 Smith, Arthur M. “Has the Red Cross-Adorned Hospital Ship Become Obsolete?” Naval 
 War College Review 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 121-131. 
 
Stewart, John. “Hospital Ships in the Second Dutch War.” Journal of Royal Navy Medical 
Service 34, (1948): 29-35. 
 
Travers, T.H.E. “Command and Leadership Styles in the British Army: The 1915 Gallipoli 
Model.” Journal of Contemporary History 29, no. 3 (July 1994): 403-442. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Franklin 122 
 
 
APPENDIX A: 
ROSTER OF U.S. ARMY AND NAVY HOSPITAL SHIPS DURING THE SECOND 
WORLD WAR 
Hull Designation ARMY Patient Capacity  
USAHS Acadia 787 
USAHS Aleda E. Lutz 778 
USAHS Algonquin 454 
USAHS Blanche F. Sigman 590 
USAHS Charles A. Stafford 706 
USAHS Chateau Thierry 484 
USAHS Dogwood 592 
USAHS Emily H.M. Weder 738 
USAHS Ernest Hinds 288 
USAHS Ernestine Koranda 722 
USAHS Frances Y. Slanger 1,628 
USAHS Jarrett M. Huddleston 582 
USAHS John J. Meany 582 
USAHS John L. Clem 286 
USAHS Larkspur 592 
USAHS Louis A. Milne 952 
USAHS Marigold 758 
USAHS Republic  1,242 
USAHS Seminole 454 
USAHS Shamrock 543 
USAHS St. Mihiel 504 
USAHS St. Olaf 586 
USAHS Thistle 455 
USAHS Wisteria 588 
 
NAVY 
AH-1 Relief 550 
AH-5 Solace  450 
AH-6 Comfort 400 
AH-7 Hope 400 
AH-8 Mercy 400 
AH-9 Bountiful 477 
AH-10 Samaritan 394 
AH-11 Refuge 626 
AH-12 Haven 802 
AH-13 Benevolence 800 
AH-14 Tranquility 802 
AH-15 Consolation 800 
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AH-16 Repose 800 
AH-17 Sanctuary 796 
AH-18 Rescue 792 
 Source: Table compiled by author using information gathered in Emory A. Massman, 
 Hospital Ships of World War II: An Illustrated Reference (Jefferson, NC: McFarland 
 & Co. Inc., 1999). 
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